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Nov 16

SkillEarth: Teaching General-Purpose Agents to Act on Earth via Skill Evolution

Recently developed remote sensing (RS) agents execute real-world tasks with complex workflows through multi-step tool invocation. These agents, however, typically rely on predefined expertise or parameter updates. They thus require updating expert knowledge or retraining models whenever new tools, tasks, or execution patterns emerge, limiting their continual adaptability in dynamic Earth environments. In this work, we seek to equip general-purpose agents with RS tool-call knowledge that can be automatically extracted from demonstrated trajectories without expert intervention or parameter updates. Specifically, we propose SkillEarth, a self-evolving skill extraction method that externalizes RS tool-call knowledge as reusable, retrievable, and evolvable skill files and refines them through observation-grounded evolution. Unlike existing automatic skill extraction methods that rely on outcome-based reflection to refine skills holistically, SkillEarth grounds skill evolution in real tool-chain execution and combines dual-judge feedback with a grounded observation routing graph for precise component-level refinement. The resulting skills are generalizable, reliable, and transferable: they improve overall RS tool-call performance across three frontier LLMs and four open-source LLMs, are refined through real tool execution feedback, and support cross-model reuse without retraining. Experiments on OpenEarth-Bench and Earth-Bench demonstrate that SkillEarth achieves better tool selection, argument correctness, execution-order consistency, and task completion than existing RS agents and skill extraction methods.

  • 6 authors
·
Nov 10

Embedding Models for Stance-Aware Argument Retrieval

In computational argumentation, obtaining arguments that explicitly support or attack given claims is a critical precursor to downstream reasoning tasks. When these supporting and attacking arguments are to be retrieved using semantic search methods, they need to be assessed for topic-relevance to the claims of interest as well as for correctness of their (positive or negative) stance towards the claims. In this paper we explore how dense embedding models (hereafter, models), powering modern retrieval pipelines, can serve as the basis of semantic search incorporating this dual assessment. We show experimentally that existing models struggle with asymmetric reasoning, exhibiting a strong bias toward topical overlap while ignoring instructional stance. We also show that correcting this bias via contrastive training triggers a new failure mode where models over-correct, over-fixating on polarity keywords (e.g., "supports" or "refutes") at the expense of the semantic topic. We thus introduce diagnostic word-ablation metrics to quantify this phenomenon and propose a data-centric solution. By implementing a balanced argument curriculum alongside LLM-augmented, stance-inverted arguments, we force the (embedding) models to learn deeper directional logic rather than exploiting superficial lexical shortcuts. Our evaluation demonstrates that, for sufficiently powerful models, this approach can alleviate the observed overcorrection, achieving further improvements in stance-aware argument retrieval.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 27

MetaRSI / RSI2: A Meta-Recursive Self-Improving System for Recursive Self-Improving Systems Themselves

Recursive self-improvement (RSI) lets a system improve the model-building machinery from its own failures, so every later model inherits the gain. Yet RSI has been validated almost exclusively on coding and formal benchmarks such as science QA and mathematics. This format bound limits RSI to improvement within a machine-checkable slice, not general capability where questions are open and correctness is settled by argument, replication, or measurement. We argue RSI must next operate across real, diverse scientific, engineering, and meta-scientific domains, not where formal evaluation is merely tractable. To that end we present MetaRSI-v1, where improvement is the scheduled composition of three typed operators over one unified paradigm. Data-RSI amplifies existing competence and marks its boundary; Harness-RSI edits a five-slot scaffold without touching weights; Model-RSI internalizes capability into parameters through bounded training. Sharing one loop kernel and artifact vocabulary, they make data, scaffold, and model changes composable rather than exclusive. A two-axis optimizer jointly decides operator order and each operator's proposal policy, while a meta-level policy revises the schedule across terms. We validate MetaRSI-v1 under the field's standard evaluations, on code and closed-form science, with no external teacher: the target model plays every role in its own loop. MetaRSI-v1 reframes self-improvement from a single-surface edit to a composition across the full model-production pipeline, opening two paths: a model route internalizing capability through training, and a harness route leaving weights untouched and thus extending self-improvement to any model reachable through an interface, with Data-RSI redefined as the shared substrate feeding both. The framework further yields refutable laws on where loops exist, how operators compose, and what supervision buys.

  • 31 authors
·
Sep 8

How susceptible are LLMs to Logical Fallacies?

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 18, 2023

Retrieving Relations, Detecting Fallacies: A RAG Approach to Political Debate Analysis

Fallacies are arguments that employ invalid reasoning, making their automatic detection critical in sensitive contexts such as high-stakes political debates, where public opinion is shaped. Spotting a fallacious argument requires contextual knowledge beyond its pure surface text. This entails world knowledge pertaining to the subject matter under discussion, as well as knowledge of the relationships that exist between arguments within the argumentative discourse. Prior work on fallacy analysis has shown that argumentative discourse structure can beneficially improve classification performance. However, such structure is typically encoded only as static classifier features, limiting its flexibility. Building on this intuition while addressing this limitation, we introduce a guided retrieval-augmented methodology for fallacy detection and classification that leverages argumentative relations of support and attack to dynamically steer the extraction of relevant documents. We evaluate our approach on the ElecDeb60to20 benchmark across 42 retrieval configurations and 14 models, performing retrieval over a 15GB knowledge base of collected political-related documents. Our approach improves macro-F1 up to 0.864 for fallacy detection and up to 0.725 for classification over non-retrieval baselines. These results show that incorporating external knowledge significantly enhances fallacy detection and classification when retrieval is argumentatively guided.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 17

Critical-Questions-of-Thought: Steering LLM reasoning with Argumentative Querying

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

  • 3 authors
·
Dec 19, 2024

TACAM: Topic And Context Aware Argument Mining

In this work we address the problem of argument search. The purpose of argument search is the distillation of pro and contra arguments for requested topics from large text corpora. In previous works, the usual approach is to use a standard search engine to extract text parts which are relevant to the given topic and subsequently use an argument recognition algorithm to select arguments from them. The main challenge in the argument recognition task, which is also known as argument mining, is that often sentences containing arguments are structurally similar to purely informative sentences without any stance about the topic. In fact, they only differ semantically. Most approaches use topic or search term information only for the first search step and therefore assume that arguments can be classified independently of a topic. We argue that topic information is crucial for argument mining, since the topic defines the semantic context of an argument. Precisely, we propose different models for the classification of arguments, which take information about a topic of an argument into account. Moreover, to enrich the context of a topic and to let models understand the context of the potential argument better, we integrate information from different external sources such as Knowledge Graphs or pre-trained NLP models. Our evaluation shows that considering topic information, especially in connection with external information, provides a significant performance boost for the argument mining task.

  • 3 authors
·
May 26, 2019

Which Side Are You On? A Multi-task Dataset for End-to-End Argument Summarisation and Evaluation

With the recent advances of large language models (LLMs), it is no longer infeasible to build an automated debate system that helps people to synthesise persuasive arguments. Previous work attempted this task by integrating multiple components. In our work, we introduce an argument mining dataset that captures the end-to-end process of preparing an argumentative essay for a debate, which covers the tasks of claim and evidence identification (Task 1 ED), evidence convincingness ranking (Task 2 ECR), argumentative essay summarisation and human preference ranking (Task 3 ASR) and metric learning for automated evaluation of resulting essays, based on human feedback along argument quality dimensions (Task 4 SQE). Our dataset contains 14k examples of claims that are fully annotated with the various properties supporting the aforementioned tasks. We evaluate multiple generative baselines for each of these tasks, including representative LLMs. We find, that while they show promising results on individual tasks in our benchmark, their end-to-end performance on all four tasks in succession deteriorates significantly, both in automated measures as well as in human-centred evaluation. This challenge presented by our proposed dataset motivates future research on end-to-end argument mining and summarisation. The repository of this project is available at https://github.com/HarrywillDr/ArgSum-Datatset

  • 11 authors
·
Jun 5, 2024

Selective Vision is the Challenge for Visual Reasoning: A Benchmark for Visual Argument Understanding

Visual arguments, often used in advertising or social causes, rely on images to persuade viewers to do or believe something. Understanding these arguments requires selective vision: only specific visual stimuli within an image are relevant to the argument, and relevance can only be understood within the context of a broader argumentative structure. While visual arguments are readily appreciated by human audiences, we ask: are today's AI capable of similar understanding? We collect and release VisArgs, an annotated corpus designed to make explicit the (usually implicit) structures underlying visual arguments. VisArgs includes 1,611 images accompanied by three types of textual annotations: 5,112 visual premises (with region annotations), 5,574 commonsense premises, and reasoning trees connecting them to a broader argument. We propose three tasks over VisArgs to probe machine capacity for visual argument understanding: localization of premises, identification of premises, and deduction of conclusions. Experiments demonstrate that 1) machines cannot fully identify the relevant visual cues. The top-performing model, GPT-4-O, achieved an accuracy of only 78.5%, whereas humans reached 98.0%. All models showed a performance drop, with an average decrease in accuracy of 19.5%, when the comparison set was changed from objects outside the image to irrelevant objects within the image. Furthermore, 2) this limitation is the greatest factor impacting their performance in understanding visual arguments. Most models improved the most when given relevant visual premises as additional inputs, compared to other inputs, for deducing the conclusion of the visual argument.

  • 7 authors
·
Jun 27, 2024

Don't Take the Premise for Granted: Evaluating the Premise Critique Ability of Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

  • 4 authors
·
May 29, 2025

Diminished Diversity-of-Thought in a Standard Large Language Model

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 13, 2023

WIBA: What Is Being Argued? A Comprehensive Approach to Argument Mining

We propose WIBA, a novel framework and suite of methods that enable the comprehensive understanding of "What Is Being Argued" across contexts. Our approach develops a comprehensive framework that detects: (a) the existence, (b) the topic, and (c) the stance of an argument, correctly accounting for the logical dependence among the three tasks. Our algorithm leverages the fine-tuning and prompt-engineering of Large Language Models. We evaluate our approach and show that it performs well in all the three capabilities. First, we develop and release an Argument Detection model that can classify a piece of text as an argument with an F1 score between 79% and 86% on three different benchmark datasets. Second, we release a language model that can identify the topic being argued in a sentence, be it implicit or explicit, with an average similarity score of 71%, outperforming current naive methods by nearly 40%. Finally, we develop a method for Argument Stance Classification, and evaluate the capability of our approach, showing it achieves a classification F1 score between 71% and 78% across three diverse benchmark datasets. Our evaluation demonstrates that WIBA allows the comprehensive understanding of What Is Being Argued in large corpora across diverse contexts, which is of core interest to many applications in linguistics, communication, and social and computer science. To facilitate accessibility to the advancements outlined in this work, we release WIBA as a free open access platform (wiba.dev).

  • 4 authors
·
May 1, 2024

What the HellaSwag? On the Validity of Common-Sense Reasoning Benchmarks

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 10, 2025

LLM-based Rewriting of Inappropriate Argumentation using Reinforcement Learning from Machine Feedback

Ensuring that online discussions are civil and productive is a major challenge for social media platforms. Such platforms usually rely both on users and on automated detection tools to flag inappropriate arguments of other users, which moderators then review. However, this kind of post-hoc moderation is expensive and time-consuming, and moderators are often overwhelmed by the amount and severity of flagged content. Instead, a promising alternative is to prevent negative behavior during content creation. This paper studies how inappropriate language in arguments can be computationally mitigated. We propose a reinforcement learning-based rewriting approach that balances content preservation and appropriateness based on existing classifiers, prompting an instruction-finetuned large language model (LLM) as our initial policy. Unlike related style transfer tasks, rewriting inappropriate arguments allows deleting and adding content permanently. It is therefore tackled on document level rather than sentence level. We evaluate different weighting schemes for the reward function in both absolute and relative human assessment studies. Systematic experiments on non-parallel data provide evidence that our approach can mitigate the inappropriateness of arguments while largely preserving their content. It significantly outperforms competitive baselines, including few-shot learning, prompting, and humans.

  • 4 authors
·
Jun 5, 2024

Probing the Geometry of Truth: Consistency and Generalization of Truth Directions in LLMs Across Logical Transformations and Question Answering Tasks

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on extensive datasets that encapsulate substantial world knowledge. However, their outputs often include confidently stated inaccuracies. Earlier works suggest that LLMs encode truthfulness as a distinct linear feature, termed the "truth direction", which can classify truthfulness reliably. We address several open questions about the truth direction: (i) whether LLMs universally exhibit consistent truth directions; (ii) whether sophisticated probing techniques are necessary to identify truth directions; and (iii) how the truth direction generalizes across diverse contexts. Our findings reveal that not all LLMs exhibit consistent truth directions, with stronger representations observed in more capable models, particularly in the context of logical negation. Additionally, we demonstrate that truthfulness probes trained on declarative atomic statements can generalize effectively to logical transformations, question-answering tasks, in-context learning, and external knowledge sources. Finally, we explore the practical application of truthfulness probes in selective question-answering, illustrating their potential to improve user trust in LLM outputs. These results advance our understanding of truth directions and provide new insights into the internal representations of LLM beliefs. Our code is public at https://github.com/colored-dye/truthfulness_probe_generalization

  • 7 authors
·
May 31, 2025

Wrong but Useful: Trajectory Value Beyond Answer Correctness in Multi-Agent Messages

Multi-agent reasoning systems often use agreement, confidence, or automated scores to decide which messages should shape a final answer. Such filtering assumes that a message likely to be correct is also worth keeping. Yet a wrong answer can contain a useful decomposition, constraint, or scientific principle. We test this distinction with Diverse Hypothesis Deliberation (DHD), a controlled measurement protocol that caches five independently generated messages and replays the same downstream solver, called the integrator, with each message available or hidden. The replay comparison measures a message's trajectory value: whether making the message available helps or harms subsequent reasoning. Across five mathematics and science benchmarks and two openly available model families, gpt-oss-120b and gemma-4-31B-it, wrong-helpful messages appear in every benchmark-model combination. Among wrong-answer messages that change final correctness, more than four in ten changes are helpful in each model. Controlled repeats show that the number of repeatable message effects is unlikely to arise from replay variation alone (p=0.0002). A focused intervention on repeatable wrong-helpful messages finds that the complete message works best, while retaining its reasoning preserves more success than retaining only its answer; the source of the complete-message advantage remains open. Within the same problem, repeated trajectory-value evidence also identifies a better keep-or-remove choice than answer correctness alone. Answer correctness is therefore informative but does not determine trajectory value. DHD measures this missing property and produces reusable labels for learning when agents should listen.

  • 10 authors
·
Aug 13

Shape of Thought: When Distribution Matters More than Correctness in Reasoning Tasks

We present the surprising finding that a language model's reasoning capabilities can be improved by training on synthetic datasets of chain-of-thought (CoT) traces from more capable models, even when all of those traces lead to an incorrect final answer. Our experiments show this approach can yield better performance on reasoning tasks than training on human-annotated datasets. We hypothesize that two key factors explain this phenomenon: first, the distribution of synthetic data is inherently closer to the language model's own distribution, making it more amenable to learning. Second, these `incorrect' traces are often only partially flawed and contain valid reasoning steps from which the model can learn. To further test the first hypothesis, we use a language model to paraphrase human-annotated traces -- shifting their distribution closer to the model's own distribution -- and show that this improves performance. For the second hypothesis, we introduce increasingly flawed CoT traces and study to what extent models are tolerant to these flaws. We demonstrate our findings across various reasoning domains like math, algorithmic reasoning and code generation using MATH, GSM8K, Countdown and MBPP datasets on various language models ranging from 1.5B to 9B across Qwen, Llama, and Gemma models. Our study shows that curating datasets that are closer to the model's distribution is a critical aspect to consider. We also show that a correct final answer is not always a reliable indicator of a faithful reasoning process.

Search-G1: Co-Evolving Representation-Based Rewards for Selective Grounded Search

Search-augmented language agents should retrieve external information only when necessary and ground their answers in retrieved evidence. Yet terminal correctness assigns equal credit to direct answers from parametric knowledge, evidence-grounded answers, and answers recalled after redundant search. Process supervision and LLM judges provide richer feedback but can require high-cost annotation or inference; low-cost, non-contrastive policy confidence signals do not directly identify whether retrieved evidence changes an answer. We propose Search-G1, a reward framework that couples retrieval necessity with evidence reliance through two intervention-calibrated hidden-state readouts for selective grounded search. A prompt readout predicts closed-book sufficiency, whose complement proxies policy-relative retrieval necessity; an answer-commit readout predicts evidence reliance as sensitivity to evidence deletion conditional on the realized reasoning prefix. A correctness-first reward gates evidence-reliance credit by retrieval necessity, rewards sufficient direct answers, and penalizes repeated search. After calibration, scoring needs neither process annotations nor LLM-judge inference. As policy-relative targets, trajectory distributions, and representations may drift, Search-G1 periodically regenerates targets and refits its readouts. Across four QA benchmarks and two scales, Search-G1 achieves competitive task accuracy, with stronger counterfactual evidence dependence and fewer searches in the main comparisons, complemented by independent human audits of answer support.

  • 10 authors
·
Oct 9

Pramana: Fine-Tuning Large Language Models for Epistemic Reasoning through Navya-Nyaya

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

  • 1 authors
·
Feb 13

Thinking Past the Answer: Evaluating Harmful Overthinking in Large Reasoning Models

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

  • 5 authors
·
May 31

Big-Big-SycoBench: A Benchmark to Detect Sycophancy Through Model Responses to Valid vs. Invalid Arguments

Sycophancy in large language models risks amplifying unsupported claims or beliefs across the knowledge ecosystem as these systems increasingly contribute to research synthesis, evaluation, and decision-making. A reliable model should revise its judgement when a user identifies a genuine flaw, but should resist pushback based on fallacies, emotion, or irrelevant appeals to authority. While sycophancy is usually measured on questions with a verifiable answer, the evaluative tasks in which it is most difficult to detect have no such ground truth. We introduce Big-Big-SycoBench, which measures sycophancy through argument discernment: the ability to revise an evaluation after valid criticism while resisting invalid pressure. The benchmark consists of 450 text artefacts with 5,400 arguments for raising or lowering their quality scores, each reviewed by one or more of twelve human annotators. An LLM scores each artefact twenty times to establish its baseline score and uncertainty. The model is then given a valid or invalid argument and asked to update its score. We only count a revision if it exceeds the model's own baseline variability. We use the resulting score delta to distinguish responsiveness to valid arguments from compliance with invalid ones. Across ten models, responsiveness is 88-95\% for seven, 76-77\% for Kimi K3 and GLM-5.3, and 32\% for Opus 5.5. Compliance ranges from 0.2\% for GPT-6 Astra to 95\% for GPT-4o. Big-Big-SycoBench is intended to guide the development of models whose judgements can be corrected by sound arguments, but not displaced by unsupported pressure.

  • 14 authors
·
Oct 10

Truthful AI: Developing and governing AI that does not lie

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

  • 8 authors
·
Oct 13, 2021

ReportLogic: Evaluating Logical Quality in Deep Research Reports

Users increasingly rely on Large Language Models (LLMs) for Deep Research, using them to synthesize diverse sources into structured reports that support understanding and action. In this context, the practical reliability of such reports hinges on logical quality: whether the report's claims and arguments are explicitly supported and can be trusted as a basis for downstream use, rather than merely appearing fluent or informative. However, current evaluation frameworks largely overlook this requirement. To bridge this gap, we introduce ReportLogic, a benchmark that quantifies report-level logical quality through a reader-centric lens of auditability. Specifically, ReportLogic adopts a hierarchical taxonomy that evaluates whether readers can (1) trace an on-topic report structure with a unified analytical arc (Macro-Logic), (2) understand the progression with necessary context (Expositional-Logic), and (3) verify conclusions via explicit claim--support (Structural-Logic). Based on this taxonomy, we construct a human-annotated rubric-guided dataset and train an open-source LogicJudge for scalable evaluation. We further evaluate judge robustness via adversarial attacks, showing that off-the-shelf LLM judges are frequently influenced by superficial cues (e.g., verbosity), and reasoning modes can mask broken support relations. Overall, our results provide actionable guidance for building more robust logic evaluators and improving the logical reliability of LLM-generated reports.

  • 7 authors
·
Jan 27

Validity-Aware Jailbreak Evaluation for Large Language Models

Jailbreak robustness has become central to large language model (LLM) safety evaluation, yet prevailing methodologies rely primarily on refusal behavior, semantic resemblance, and intent-matching heuristics that emphasize linguistic plausibility rather than correctness. We identify a key limitation in existing evaluations: many jailbreak intents depend on instructional validity rather than epistemic factuality, allowing realistic-looking responses to be labeled successful despite being factually or procedurally incorrect. To address this gap, we propose Sequential Epistemic and Action-Level Validation (SEAV), a verification-centric jailbreak evaluation framework that decomposes responses into ordered steps and evaluates both validity and correctness. SEAV combines LLM-as-a-judge mechanisms for semantic interpretation with retrieval-grounded verification using external knowledge sources, assessing whether generated content is factually correct, structurally consistent, and operationally capable of advancing harmful objectives. Empirically, SEAV cuts the false-positive rate on SD-A (a curated strategic-dishonesty diagnostic) by 14.9\,pp vs. the strongest baseline, and reclassifies 22.1\%--51.0\% of sampled prior-labeled successes as invalid across three of four public benchmarks. Together, these results show that enforcing correctness substantially reshapes measured robustness: many previously labeled jailbreak successes are reclassified as invalid, and results are stable across the tested search backends and evaluator models. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Ardor-Wu/SEAV.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 30

Benchmarking at the Edge of Comprehension

As frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly saturate new benchmarks shortly after they are published, benchmarking itself is at a juncture: if frontier models keep improving, it will become increasingly hard for humans to generate discriminative tasks, provide accurate ground-truth answers, or evaluate complex solutions. If benchmarking becomes infeasible, our ability to measure any progress in AI is at stake. We refer to this scenario as the post-comprehension regime. In this work, we propose Critique-Resilient Benchmarking, an adversarial framework designed to compare models even when full human understanding is infeasible. Our technique relies on the notion of critique-resilient correctness: an answer is deemed correct if no adversary has convincingly proved otherwise. Unlike standard benchmarking, humans serve as bounded verifiers and focus on localized claims, which preserves evaluation integrity beyond full comprehension of the task. Using an itemized bipartite Bradley-Terry model, we jointly rank LLMs by their ability to solve challenging tasks and to generate difficult yet solvable questions. We showcase the effectiveness of our method in the mathematical domain across eight frontier LLMs, showing that the resulting scores are stable and correlate with external capability measures. Our framework reformulates benchmarking as an adversarial generation-evaluation game in which humans serve as final adjudicators.

  • 11 authors
·
Feb 15

Knowing Is Not Choosing: What Explicit Verification Adds Beyond Generative Preference

Generating a correct answer does not mean that a language model will select it. We separate factual recall into three steps: generating a correct candidate, ranking the available candidates, and selecting the final answer. Pre-generation readouts predict factual recall and which questions sampling will cover across three model families, but say little about whether an available correct answer will ultimately be selected. Explicit verification with P(True) improves within-question ranking over mean log-likelihood in Gemma, Qwen3, and Llama, with AUROC gains of 0.08--0.12. In a prospectively defined Gemma cohort, verification raises plurality accuracy by about 5 points, and still gains about 2 points over chat-template likelihood, a stronger generative baseline. The advantage is strongest for relations with common-answer priors and depends on access to the entity; masking the entity removes the ranking advantage in larger Qwen models. Finally, the measured benefit depends on how correctness is defined: recall-oriented reference matching can credit option lists favored by likelihood and substantially understate the improvement seen under human semantic judgments. Prior work shows that models can carry latent factual knowledge and judge candidate answers; we show that these capabilities do not collapse into a single notion of ``knowing,'' and trace where information is gained, lost, or mismeasured between availability, ranking, and final choice.

  • 4 authors
·
Sep 28

AI Debaters are More Persuasive when Arguing in Alignment with Their Own Beliefs

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

  • 12 authors
·
Oct 15, 2025

When Reasoning Helps Action: Monitoring and Steering Chain-of-Thought in Vision-Language-Action Policies

Reasoning-enabled VLA policies expose chain-of-thought (CoT) traces that appear to explain and guide their actions, creating a potential interface for runtime safety through reasoning monitoring and correction. In this work, we define and operationalize two evaluation axes for assessing when this interface can improve embodied behavior: correctability, which measures whether unreliable reasoning can be detected and improved during generation, and actionability, which measures whether reasoning corrections produce behaviorally meaningful changes in the intended direction. To enable correctability, we introduce Token-level Reward for Utility-Steered Chain-of-Thought (TRUST), an offline-trained value model that predicts eventual reasoning correctness from partial prefixes and uses these estimates to monitor and selectively steer reasoning generation in frozen VLA policies. On the Alpamayo 1.5 driving VLA, TRUST monitors correctness with 88.9% accuracy and improves reasoning correctness from 75.9% to 90.0%. On a baseline-defined challenging subset in AlpaSim, TRUST reduces collision rate by 30.4% and maximum trajectory error by 11.5% relative to the unsteered policy, outperforming a compute-matched Best-of-4 baseline. On the DeepThinkVLA manipulation VLA, TRUST improves the correctness of grasp-state claims from 69.3% to 90.2% and action-choice claims from 68.8% to 85.9%, yet closed-loop task performance on LIBERO-Plus remains largely unchanged. Empirical analysis reveals intent-consistent behavioral effects in Alpamayo 1.5 but limited effects in DeepThinkVLA, helping interpret these different task-level outcomes. Together, our results show that gains in reasoning correctness do not automatically imply gains in embodied performance, motivating evaluation of correctability and actionability when using CoT as a runtime safety interface.

  • 4 authors
·
Sep 29

Personas as a Way to Model Truthfulness in Language Models

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 27, 2023 1

LogicBench: Towards Systematic Evaluation of Logical Reasoning Ability of Large Language Models

Recently developed large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform remarkably well on a wide range of language understanding tasks. But, can they really "reason" over the natural language? This question has been receiving significant research attention and many reasoning skills such as commonsense, numerical, and qualitative have been studied. However, the crucial skill pertaining to 'logical reasoning' has remained underexplored. Existing work investigating this reasoning ability of LLMs has focused only on a couple of inference rules (such as modus ponens and modus tollens) of propositional and first-order logic. Addressing the above limitation, we comprehensively evaluate the logical reasoning ability of LLMs on 25 different reasoning patterns spanning over propositional, first-order, and non-monotonic logics. To enable systematic evaluation, we introduce LogicBench, a natural language question-answering dataset focusing on the use of a single inference rule. We conduct detailed analysis with a range of LLMs such as GPT-4, ChatGPT, Gemini, Llama-2, and Mistral using chain-of-thought prompting. Experimental results show that existing LLMs do not fare well on LogicBench; especially, they struggle with instances involving complex reasoning and negations. Furthermore, they sometimes overlook contextual information necessary for reasoning to arrive at the correct conclusion. We believe that our work and findings facilitate future research for evaluating and enhancing the logical reasoning ability of LLMs. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Mihir3009/LogicBench.

  • 8 authors
·
Jun 5, 2024

ReCEval: Evaluating Reasoning Chains via Correctness and Informativeness

Multi-step reasoning ability is fundamental to many natural language tasks, yet it is unclear what constitutes a good reasoning chain and how to evaluate them. Most existing methods focus solely on whether the reasoning chain leads to the correct conclusion, but this answer-oriented view may confound reasoning quality with other spurious shortcuts to predict the answer. To bridge this gap, we evaluate reasoning chains by viewing them as informal proofs that derive the final answer. Specifically, we propose ReCEval (Reasoning Chain Evaluation), a framework that evaluates reasoning chains via two key properties: (1) correctness, i.e., each step makes a valid inference based on information contained within the step, preceding steps, and input context, and (2) informativeness, i.e., each step provides new information that is helpful towards deriving the generated answer. We evaluate these properties by developing metrics using natural language inference models and V-Information. On multiple datasets, we show that ReCEval effectively identifies various error types and yields notable improvements compared to prior methods. We analyze the impact of step boundaries, and previous steps on evaluating correctness and demonstrate that our informativeness metric captures the expected flow of information in high-quality reasoning chains. Finally, we show that scoring reasoning chains based on ReCEval improves downstream task performance. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/archiki/ReCEval

  • 4 authors
·
Nov 29, 2023

RFEval: Benchmarking Reasoning Faithfulness under Counterfactual Reasoning Intervention in Large Reasoning Models

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

  • 3 authors
·
Feb 18

Generalized Correctness Models: Learning Calibrated and Model-Agnostic Correctness Predictors from Historical Patterns

Generating accurate and calibrated confidence estimates is critical for deploying LLMs in high-stakes or user-facing applications, and remains an open challenge. Prior research has often framed confidence as a problem of eliciting a model's "self-knowledge", i.e., the ability of an LLM to judge whether its own answers are correct; this approach implicitly assumes that there is some privileged information about the answer's correctness that is accessible to the model itself. However, our experiments reveal that an LLM attempting to predict the correctness of its own outputs generally performs no better than an unrelated LLM. Moreover, we hypothesize that a key factor in building a "Correctness Model" (CM) is exposure to a target model's historical predictions. We propose multiple methods to inject this historical correctness information, creating a Generalized Correctness Model (GCM). We first show that GCMs can be trained on the correctness data from many LLMs and learn patterns for correctness prediction applicable across datasets and models. We then use CMs as a lens for studying the source of correctness prediction ability and its generalization, systematically controlling their training data and finding that answer phrasing is a strong predictor for correctness. We further explore alternative methods of injecting history without training an LLM, finding that including history as in-context examples can help improve correctness prediction, and post-hoc calibration can provide complementary reductions in calibration error. We evaluate GCMs based on Qwen3-8B across 5 model families and the MMLU and TriviaQA datasets, as well as on a downstream selective prediction task, finding that reliable LLM confidence estimation is a generalizable and model-agnostic skill learned by systematically encoding correctness history rather than a model-specific skill reliant on self-introspection.

  • 5 authors
·
Sep 29, 2025 2

Neither True nor False: Do LLMs Represent Truth-Value Gaps in Plural Predication?

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to summarize and verify claims in critical sources that inform consequential decisions. Such claims are full of plural definites. If three of five patients improved after taking drug A, the claim the patients improved after drug A is not true, since two did not, yet its negation, the patients didn't improve after drug A, is not true either, since three did. In formal semantics, this truth-value gap is known as the Homogeneity Gap: both the plural definite and its negation are neither true nor false when the property holds for only a fraction of the plural referent. A model that cannot represent this gap turns mixed evidence into a clean verdict, an error that can be costly in high-stakes use. We introduce HomogeneityNLI, a diagnostic dataset of 1,000 minimal pair items crossing determiner, polarity, and group composition across ten logical conditions. Evaluating seven open-weight models, we uncover a pervasive Bivalence Bias: models assign plural definites their homogeneous truth conditions. In the zero-shot setting, no model recognizes the gap for both polarities in more than 15% of scenarios, and negated definites are judged False in 84% of cases. Explicit linguistic rules, chain-of-thought, and enumeration prompts produce unstable, model-specific effects that often entrench the bias. Our findings indicate that current open-weight LLMs acquire the truth conditions of plural predication but not its trivalent logic, and cannot yet be trusted to summarize or verify claims whose evidence is mixed.

Large Pre-trained Language Models Contain Human-like Biases of What is Right and Wrong to Do

Artificial writing is permeating our lives due to recent advances in large-scale, transformer-based language models (LMs) such as BERT, its variants, GPT-2/3, and others. Using them as pre-trained models and fine-tuning them for specific tasks, researchers have extended state of the art for many NLP tasks and shown that they capture not only linguistic knowledge but also retain general knowledge implicitly present in the data. Unfortunately, LMs trained on unfiltered text corpora suffer from degenerated and biased behaviour. While this is well established, we show that recent LMs also contain human-like biases of what is right and wrong to do, some form of ethical and moral norms of the society -- they bring a "moral direction" to surface. That is, we show that these norms can be captured geometrically by a direction, which can be computed, e.g., by a PCA, in the embedding space, reflecting well the agreement of phrases to social norms implicitly expressed in the training texts and providing a path for attenuating or even preventing toxic degeneration in LMs. Being able to rate the (non-)normativity of arbitrary phrases without explicitly training the LM for this task, we demonstrate the capabilities of the "moral direction" for guiding (even other) LMs towards producing normative text and showcase it on RealToxicityPrompts testbed, preventing the neural toxic degeneration in GPT-2.

  • 5 authors
·
Mar 8, 2021

Outcome-supervised Verifiers for Planning in Mathematical Reasoning

Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with maintaining accuracy across a sequence of intermediate reasoning steps in mathematical reasoning, leading to error propagation that undermines the final result. The current methodology to mitigate this issue primarily involves using a verifier model to assess the correctness of generated solution candidates, focusing either on the overall reasoning path or on an incomplete reasoning path. By rethinking this approach, we argue that assessing potentials of incomplete reasoning paths could be more advantageous as it guides towards correct final answers, transforming the task into a planning problem. Our proposed verifier, the Outcome-supervision Value Model (OVM), employs outcome supervision for training, offering an efficient and intuitive method for planning by prioritizing steps that lead to accurate conclusions over mere per-step correctness. Furthermore, the OVM eschews the need for labor-intensive annotations on step-level correctness, enhancing its scalability. Our experiments on two multi-step mathematical reasoning datasets, GSM8K and Game of 24, demonstrate the superior performance of the OVM model. Notably, in GSM8K, our OVM-7B model achieves state-of-the-art results among LLMs up to 13B parameters; especially it does not utilize GPT-4 or code execution. These findings offer a novel perspective on the role of outcome supervision in training verifiers for multi-step reasoning tasks and provide theoretical justification for its advantage in value estimation for planning.

  • 3 authors
·
Nov 16, 2023

Debate Helps Supervise Unreliable Experts

As AI systems are used to answer more difficult questions and potentially help create new knowledge, judging the truthfulness of their outputs becomes more difficult and more important. How can we supervise unreliable experts, which have access to the truth but may not accurately report it, to give answers that are systematically true and don't just superficially seem true, when the supervisor can't tell the difference between the two on their own? In this work, we show that debate between two unreliable experts can help a non-expert judge more reliably identify the truth. We collect a dataset of human-written debates on hard reading comprehension questions where the judge has not read the source passage, only ever seeing expert arguments and short quotes selectively revealed by 'expert' debaters who have access to the passage. In our debates, one expert argues for the correct answer, and the other for an incorrect answer. Comparing debate to a baseline we call consultancy, where a single expert argues for only one answer which is correct half of the time, we find that debate performs significantly better, with 84% judge accuracy compared to consultancy's 74%. Debates are also more efficient, being 68% of the length of consultancies. By comparing human to AI debaters, we find evidence that with more skilled (in this case, human) debaters, the performance of debate goes up but the performance of consultancy goes down. Our error analysis also supports this trend, with 46% of errors in human debate attributable to mistakes by the honest debater (which should go away with increased skill); whereas 52% of errors in human consultancy are due to debaters obfuscating the relevant evidence from the judge (which should become worse with increased skill). Overall, these results show that debate is a promising approach for supervising increasingly capable but potentially unreliable AI systems.

  • 7 authors
·
Nov 15, 2023

Verifiable by Design: Aligning Language Models to Quote from Pre-Training Data

For humans to trust the fluent generations of large language models (LLMs), they must be able to verify their correctness against trusted, external sources. Recent efforts aim to increase verifiability through citations of retrieved documents or post-hoc provenance. However, such citations are prone to mistakes that further complicate their verifiability. To address these limitations, we tackle the verifiability goal with a different philosophy: we trivialize the verification process by developing models that quote verbatim statements from trusted sources in pre-training data. We propose Quote-Tuning, which demonstrates the feasibility of aligning LLMs to leverage memorized information and quote from pre-training data. Quote-Tuning quantifies quoting against large corpora with efficient membership inference tools, and uses the amount of quotes as an implicit reward signal to construct a synthetic preference dataset for quoting, without any human annotation. Next, the target model is aligned to quote using preference optimization algorithms. Experimental results show that Quote-Tuning significantly increases the percentage of LLM generation quoted verbatim from high-quality pre-training documents by 55% to 130% relative to untuned models while maintaining response quality. Further experiments demonstrate that Quote-Tuning generalizes quoting to out-of-domain data, is applicable in different tasks, and provides additional benefits to truthfulness. Quote-Tuning not only serves as a hassle-free method to increase quoting but also opens up avenues for improving LLM trustworthiness through better verifiability.

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 4, 2024

Ontology-Grounded, Reasoner-Verified Benchmarks for Evaluating LLM Reasoning in Scientific AI

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly underpin scientific AI applications that reason over structured knowledge, from biomedical question answering to materials informatics. However, their logical reasoning often falls short, producing factual inaccuracies unacceptable in these settings. Reliable evaluation remains challenging: manual dataset construction scales poorly, and LLM-based generation risks embedding the very flaws it aims to measure. High-quality benchmarks must ground both correct and incorrect labelled examples in explicit background knowledge, formally verifiable by a standard reasoner. We propose a pipeline that automatically generates ontology-grounded multiple-choice question (MCQ) benchmarks from any sufficiently axiomatised OWL 2 ontology, with correct answers grounded in the ontology by design. Distractors are generated by perturbing the right-hand-side class expressions of class definition axioms, and their incorrectness is formally verified by an OWL reasoner via entailment checks. We evaluate the pipeline on three ontologies: Pizza (small, academic), PMDco (complex, materials science), and DOID (large, biomedical), generating 112, 2,491, and 15,216 MCQs respectively. Distractors span four semantic categories from class unsatisfiability to weakened subsumptions, enabling diagnostic evaluation of specific reasoning failures. Items meet natural language quality standards: mean LLM judge scores of 4.02, 4.36, and 3.36 out of 5 confirm fluency, and correct-answer-to-distractor similarity above 0.8 shows that wrong options cannot be dismissed on surface form alone. Six LLMs evaluated zero-shot achieve 41.1-76.8% accuracy, well above the 25% random-guessing baseline, indicating the benchmarks are challenging and discriminative. This work is a step towards more reliable benchmarks for assessing logical reasoning in scientific AI.

  • 4 authors
·
Sep 29

Answer-Conditioned Chains of Thought Degrade Verifiable-Reasoning Distillation in Large Language Models

A standard recipe for distilling the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) is to sample chains of thought from the model, keep those that reach the correct final answer, and fine-tune on the survivors. When sampling fails, a common fix shows the generator the gold answer and asks it to write a chain that reaches that answer. We show that this second step degrades the training data in a way that correctness filtering cannot catch. We run a controlled experiment that fixes the generator, the problem set, and the correctness filter, and varies only whether the chain is generated under answer-conditioning, the gold answer shown with a request to reach it. Training a strong instruction-tuned reasoning model on its own answer-conditioned chains sharply lowers its verifiable-reasoning accuracy. The loss grows with difficulty, reaching as much as about 27 points on the hardest competition problems. The mechanism is legible in the chains themselves, which rationalize backward from the shown answer instead of deriving it, with the early final-answer statement as the measurable symptom. The harm is a property of the data rather than the generator, read off unlabeled generations before any fine-tuning, ordering the penalty across eight thinking models from four families, and transferring across teacher families. A prompt ablation localizes it to the rationalize-toward instruction rather than the answer's bare visibility. The practical takeaway is to generate answer-blind, because no correctness filter can see this damage in the data.

  • 7 authors
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Jul 15