Daily Papers

Sequential LLM agents fail on long-horizon planning with hard constraints like budgets and diversity requirements. As planning progresses and context grows, these agents drift from global constraints. We propose HiMAP-Travel, a hierarchical multi-agent framework that splits planning into strategic coordination and parallel day-level execution. A Coordinator allocates resources across days, while Day Executors plan independently in parallel. Three key mechanisms enable this: a transactional monitor enforcing budget and uniqueness constraints across parallel agents, a bargaining protocol allowing agents to reject infeasible sub-goals and trigger re-planning, and a single policy trained with GRPO that powers all agents through role conditioning. On TravelPlanner, HiMAP-Travel with Qwen3-8B achieves 52.78% validation and 52.65% test Final Pass Rate (FPR). In a controlled comparison with identical model, training, and tools, it outperforms the sequential DeepTravel baseline by +8.67~pp. It also surpasses ATLAS by +17.65~pp and MTP by +10.0~pp. On FlexTravelBench multi-turn scenarios, it achieves 44.34% (2-turn) and 37.42% (3-turn) FPR while reducing latency 2.5x through parallelization.

Leveraging an established exercise in negotiation education, we build a novel dataset for studying how the use of language shapes bilateral bargaining. Our dataset extends existing work in two ways: 1) we recruit participants via behavioral labs instead of crowdsourcing platforms and allow participants to negotiate through audio, enabling more naturalistic interactions; 2) we add a control setting where participants negotiate only through alternating, written numeric offers. Despite the two contrasting forms of communication, we find that the average agreed prices of the two treatments are identical. But when subjects can talk, fewer offers are exchanged, negotiations finish faster, the likelihood of reaching agreement rises, and the variance of prices at which subjects agree drops substantially. We further propose a taxonomy of speech acts in negotiation and enrich the dataset with annotated speech acts. Our work also reveals linguistic signals that are predictive of negotiation outcomes.

Urban assessments often compress diverse needs into single scores, which can obscure minority perspectives. We present a community-centered study in Montreal (n=35; wheelchair users, seniors, LGBTQIA2+ residents, and immigrants). Participants rated 20 streets (accessibility, inclusivity, aesthetics, practicality) and ranked 7 images on 12 interview-elicited criteria. Disagreement patterns were systematic in our sample: wheelchair users diverged most on accessibility and practicality; LGBTQIA2+ participants emphasized inclusion and liveliness; seniors prioritized security. Group discussion reduced information gaps but not value conflicts; ratings conveyed intensity, while rankings forced trade-offs. We then formalize negotiative alignment, a transparent, budget-aware bargaining procedure, and pilot it with role-played stakeholder agents plus a neutral mediator. Relative to the best base design under the same public rubric, the negotiated package increased total utility (21.10 to 24.55), raised the worst-group utility (3.20 to 3.90), improved twentieth percentile satisfaction (0.86 to 1.00; min-max normalized within the scenario), and reduced inequality (Gini 0.036 to 0.025). Treating disagreement as signal and reporting worst-group outcomes alongside totals may help planners and AI practitioners surface trade-offs and preserve minority priorities while maintaining efficiency.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

Much of human dialogue occurs in semi-cooperative settings, where agents with different goals attempt to agree on common decisions. Negotiations require complex communication and reasoning skills, but success is easy to measure, making this an interesting task for AI. We gather a large dataset of human-human negotiations on a multi-issue bargaining task, where agents who cannot observe each other's reward functions must reach an agreement (or a deal) via natural language dialogue. For the first time, we show it is possible to train end-to-end models for negotiation, which must learn both linguistic and reasoning skills with no annotated dialogue states. We also introduce dialogue rollouts, in which the model plans ahead by simulating possible complete continuations of the conversation, and find that this technique dramatically improves performance. Our code and dataset are publicly available (https://github.com/facebookresearch/end-to-end-negotiator).

Foundation models are moving from response generation into operational roles. They plan across steps, call tools, request human input, coordinate with other agents, and increasingly carry responsibility for work that affects customers, claims, code, contracts, and clinical decisions. Production deployments are no longer one human supervising one model. They are multi-human, multi-agent collaborations that cross teams, time zones, and trust boundaries. The technical surface for this collaboration remains weakly specified. When an agent drafts a response and a human edits it before it ships, the moment of human judgement is the most valuable signal in the system. In current practice it is recorded, if at all, in application code, chat threads, ticket comments, and tribal memory. Two protocol standards address adjacent concerns: MCP standardises agent access to tools and data, and A2A standardises agent-to-agent interoperability. Neither defines the shared workspace in which humans and agents perform accountable work together. This paper presents CHAP, the Collaborative Human-Agent Protocol. Under CHAP, the override that used to vanish into a chat thread becomes a structured event carrying a diff, a rationale, and a content hash. The handoff between shifts becomes a portable envelope rather than a pinned message. The human approval of an agent's draft becomes a non-repudiable signed decision that can be replayed years later. The protocol achieves this through a small Core (workspaces, participants, tasks, artefacts, and an append-only evidence log) together with composable profiles that add review, modes, routing, deliberation, handoff, identity, signatures, and transparency-backed audit as deployments require them. Specification, reference implementation, conformance suite, and worked examples are available at: https://github.com/BrightbeamAI/chap

Autonomous negotiation agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings such as insurance and procurement. While cryptographic techniques protect explicitly disclosed constraint values, they fail to address a subtler threat: behavioral privacy leakage, where an adversary infers private constraints from observable negotiation dynamics such as concession trajectories, timing, and convergence patterns. This paper investigates behavioral differential privacy in multi-round negotiation protocols. We design an adaptive stochastic negotiation policy that jointly guarantees (varepsilon, δ)-differential privacy, almost-sure convergence of the offer sequence (reaching agreement when the counterparty's reservation value permits), and high negotiation utility. Evaluated on 3,000 synthetic bilateral negotiations, our mechanism reduces adversarial inference accuracy by 43-50% while maintaining a negotiation success rate and utility above 90%, demonstrating that strong privacy guarantees can be achieved without significant loss of performance.

Bargaining is often regarded as a logical arena rather than an art or a matter of intuition, yet Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle to navigate it due to limited strategic depth and difficulty adapting to complex human factors. Current benchmarks rarely capture this limitation. To bridge this gap, we present an utility feedback centric framework. Our contributions are: (i) AgoraBench, a new benchmark spanning nine challenging settings (e.g., deception, monopoly) that supports diverse strategy modeling; (ii) human-aligned, economically grounded metrics derived from utility theory. This is operationalized via agent utility, negotiation power, and acquisition ratio that implicitly measure how well the negotiation aligns with human preference and (iii) a human preference grounded dataset with learning pipeline that strengthens LLMs' bargaining ability through both prompting and finetuning. Empirical results indicate that baseline LLM strategies often diverge from human preferences, while our mechanism substantially improves negotiation performance, yielding deeper strategic behavior and stronger opponent awareness.

Coding-agent benchmarks evaluate whether a single uninterrupted agent can resolve a repository issue. Real software work is messier: tasks are interrupted, reassigned, reviewed, and resumed from partial states left by another agent or engineer. We study this missing dimension through handoff debt: the rediscovery cost imposed when a predecessor's work is opaque or incomplete. Our takeover protocol interrupts a coding agent at deterministic handoff points, freezes the repository, and evaluates successor agents under four handoff views: repository state only, raw trace, summary notes, and structured notes. Across 75 source tasks, the protocol generates 181 handoff-point tasks and 724 takeover runs per successor model. Across three successor models, context-bearing handoffs reduce median agent events by 20-59% and cumulative prompt tokens by 42-63% relative to repository-only takeover. Solved-rate effects are smaller and model-dependent, but efficiency gains are consistent. These findings suggest that coding-agent evaluation should report not only whether a task is solved, but also how costly that work is for another agent to resume.

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.

This paper presents a reproducibility study and extension of "Cooperation, Competition, and Maliciousness: LLM-Stakeholders Interactive Negotiation." We validate the original findings using a range of open-weight models (1.5B-70B parameters) and GPT-4o Mini while introducing several novel contributions. We analyze the Pareto front of the games, propose a communication-free baseline to test whether successful negotiations are possible without agent interaction, evaluate recent small language models' performance, analyze structural information leakage in model responses, and implement an inequality metric to assess negotiation fairness. Our results demonstrate that smaller models (<10B parameters) struggle with format adherence and coherent responses, but larger open-weight models can approach proprietary model performance. Additionally, in many scenarios, single-agent approaches can achieve comparable results to multi-agent negotiations, challenging assumptions about the necessity of agent communication to perform well on the benchmark. This work also provides insights into the accessibility, fairness, environmental impact, and privacy considerations of LLM-based negotiation systems.

Multiple agents may often conflict in an organization: for example, one coding agent changes an interface in a repository, but another continues to develop on the old version where existing tests become stale. A conversation can resolve the episode, but when the participants change, what makes the lesson continue to govern the team? We introduce Relic, which turns recurring collaboration failures into organization-owned, executable protocols. Members reflect on visible work, propose rules, and govern their adoption. Adopted protocols bind triggers, responsibilities, required evidence, and execution consequences to the runtime, while remaining open to revision and retirement. In one traced case, repeated integration friction produces an interface-review rule that governs later pull requests and is revised as work continues. Across 360 controlled runs over ten software workloads and three models, Relic raises complete-contract delivery from 14.06% to 19.76% (+5.71 percentage points) over a matched structured team without the protocol lifecycle, improving all four verified production endpoints in every model stratum. Under fresh-member transfer, behavioral correctness is 25.4% with no inherited protocol, 34.6% with the same rules provided as readable text, and 41.2% with executable bindings, a +6.5-point advantage over text alone. On the full CooperBench benchmark, after excluding broken benchmark pairs, Relic achieves 367/477 (76.9%), establishing the best reported result among peer-structured systems. On the fixed 48-pair same-model subset, Relic also exceeds Solo (29/48 vs. 26/48), reversing the coordination loss exhibited by the official peer baseline. Together, these results show how collaboration experience can become persistent organizational state that remains useful beyond the members who created it.

Negotiation is one of the crucial abilities in human communication, and there has been a resurgent research interest in negotiation dialogue systems recently, which goal is to empower intelligent agents with such ability that can efficiently help humans resolve conflicts or reach beneficial agreements. Although there have been many explorations in negotiation dialogue systems, a systematic review of this task has to date remained notably absent. To this end, we aim to fill this gap by reviewing contemporary studies in the emerging field of negotiation dialogue systems, covering benchmarks, evaluations, and methodologies. Furthermore, we also discuss potential future directions, including multi-modal, multi-party, and cross-cultural negotiation scenarios. Our goal is to provide the community with a systematic overview of negotiation dialogue systems and to inspire future research.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

Demographic synthetic survey panels are often validated by matching aggregate answers to published surveys. We test what that certificate establishes across six multiselect batteries from four survey organisations in three countries. The headline analysis is restricted to three instruments whose synthetic cohort and human target share the stated population frame; three other batteries remain sensitivity analyses. The response contract dominates measured fidelity. In the aligned instruments, committed sets leave 66 of 128 model-battery option slots empty in panels of up to 500 respondents, versus 0 of 128 under per-option probability elicitation. Across eight uncapped model-instrument comparisons, probabilities reduce option-marginal MAE by 4.53 to 7.30 points. The capped instrument reverses on two models until the vectors are projected onto its stated maximum. These are measurement effects: human targets are realised check-all responses, whereas the vectors are latent inclusion propensities. Published marginal agreement also fails to discriminate respondent simulation from direct population estimation. On nine aligned model-battery pairs, a no-persona population-prevalence query averages 6.27 MAE versus 12.39 for committed panels and wins all nine comparisons. Constraint-aware probability vectors average 5.34 and beat the query on four of nine, so the baseline challenges the validation criterion rather than proving direct estimation uniformly best. On three unpublished demographic cells, neither approach beats reciting the national distribution. Population-marginal agreement is therefore evidence about an elicitation contract and an estimand obtainable without simulated respondents, not evidence of individual simulation.