Daily Papers

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) is a widely adopted method for customizing large-scale language models. In distributed, untrusted training environments, an open source base model user may want to use LoRA weights created by an external contributor, leading to two requirements: (1) the base model user must confirm that the LoRA weights are effective when paired with the intended base model, and (2) the LoRA contributor must keep their proprietary weights private until compensation is assured. We present ZKLoRA, a zero-knowledge verification protocol that relies on succinct proofs and our novel Multi-Party Inference procedure to verify LoRA-base model compatibility without exposing LoRA weights. ZKLoRA produces deterministic correctness guarantees and validates each LoRA module in only 1-2 seconds on state-of-the-art large language models. This low-latency approach enables nearly real-time verification and promotes secure collaboration among geographically decentralized teams and contract-based training pipelines. The protocol ensures that the delivered LoRA module works as claimed, safeguarding the contributor's intellectual property while providing the base model user with verification of compatibility and lineage.

Humanity's Last Exam (HLE) has become a widely used benchmark for evaluating frontier large language models on challenging, multi-domain questions. However, community-led analyses have raised concerns that HLE contains a non-trivial number of noisy items, which can bias evaluation results and distort cross-model comparisons. To address this challenge, we introduce HLE-Verified, a verified and revised version of HLE with a transparent verification protocol and fine-grained error taxonomy. Our construction follows a two-stage validation-and-repair workflow resulting in a certified benchmark. In Stage I, each item undergoes binary validation of the problem and final answer through domain-expert review and model-based cross-checks, yielding 641 verified items. In Stage II, flawed but fixable items are revised under strict constraints preserving the original evaluation intent, through dual independent expert repairs, model-assisted auditing, and final adjudication, resulting in 1,170 revised-and-certified items. The remaining 689 items are released as a documented uncertain set with explicit uncertainty sources and expertise tags for future refinement. We evaluate seven state-of-the-art language models on HLE and HLE-Verified, observing an average absolute accuracy gain of 7--10 percentage points on HLE-Verified. The improvement is particularly pronounced on items where the original problem statement and/or reference answer is erroneous, with gains of 30--40 percentage points. Our analyses further reveal a strong association between model confidence and the presence of errors in the problem statement or reference answer, supporting the effectiveness of our revisions. Overall, HLE-Verified improves HLE-style evaluations by reducing annotation noise and enabling more faithful measurement of model capabilities. Data is available at: https://github.com/SKYLENAGE-AI/HLE-Verified

Large language models (LLMs) show strong capabilities in general reasoning but typically lack reliability in scientific domains like quantum mechanics, which demand strict adherence to physical constraints. This limitation arises from the scarcity of verifiable training resources and the inadequacy of coarse feedback signals in standard alignment paradigms. To address the data challenge, we introduce QuantumQA, a large-scale dataset constructed via a task-adaptive strategy and a hybrid verification protocol that combines deterministic solvers with semantic auditing to guarantee scientific rigor. Building on this foundation, we propose the verification-aware reward model (VRM) tailored for Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), which employs an adaptive reward fusion (ARF) mechanism to dynamically integrate deterministic signals from a scientific execution suite (SES) with multidimensional semantic evaluations for precise supervision. Experimental results demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms baselines and general-purpose preference models. Notably, our optimized 8B model achieves performance competitive with proprietary models, validating that incorporating verifiable, rule-based feedback into the reinforcement learning loop offers a parameter-efficient alternative to pure scaling.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

AI web agents use Internet resources at far greater speed, scale, and complexity -- changing how users and services interact. Deployed maliciously or erroneously, these agents could overload content providers. At the same time, web agents can bypass CAPTCHAs and other defenses by mimicking user behavior or flood authentication systems with fake accounts. Yet providers must protect their services and content from denial-of-service attacks and scraping by web agents. In this paper, we design a framework that imposes tunable costs on agents before providing access to resources; we call this Web Agent Throttling. We start by formalizing Throttling Gates as challenges issued to an agent that are asymmetric, scalable, robust, and compatible with any agent. Focusing on a common component -- the language model -- we require the agent to solve reasoning puzzles, thereby incurring excessive token-generation costs. However, we find that using existing puzzles, e.g., coding or math, as throttling gates fails to satisfy our properties. To address this, we introduce rebus-based Reasoning Gates, synthetic text puzzles that require multi-hop reasoning over world knowledge (thereby throttling an agent's model). We design a scalable generation and verification protocol for such reasoning gates. Our framework achieves computational asymmetry, i.e., the response-generation cost is 9.2x higher than the generation cost for SOTA models. We further deploy reasoning gates on a custom website and Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and evaluate with real-world web agents. Finally, we discuss the limitations and environmental impact of real-world deployment of our framework.

Deep face recognition (FR) models reach near-saturated accuracy but remain opaque: a practitioner cannot ask which semantic attributes a similarity score relied upon. EXPL-FR answers this inside the FR model's own embedding space. A lightweight adapter aligns a vision-language model's (VLM) image encoder with the frozen FR space, trained on face images alone and never on text. Because the VLM's encoders share one space, the same adapter applies to the text encoder, turning 978 attribute prompts in 22 categories, also extendable, into FR-space anchors at no extra cost. We do not assume this transfer works: a face-verification protocol measures it, and an ablation changing only the adapter isolates its contribution. Not every concept survives, because an FR model earns its invariances by discarding the factors it must verify identities across. A label-free detectability measure compares each concept's separability in FR space against the VLM space, and the 100 most detectable form the model's readable semantic signature, which separates identities better than the full vocabulary. We cover four FR backbones and two VLM encoders, EXPL-FR needs no architecture access, and supports identity-level, per-image, and differential explanations. We benchmark attribute-level auditing under three supervision settings, human labels (current practice), VLM pseudo-labels, and our fully prompt-driven audit, against real verification behavior. With no labels, the prompt-driven audit ranks four FR models by their measured per-ethnicity RFW errors and ranks controlled attribute changes by their true verification cost.

LLM agents are increasingly deployed in collaborative settings, yet long-term interaction may give rise to undesirable coordination. We study the emergence of collusion in a long-horizon multi-agent environment: two agents repeatedly complete individual tasks, share task logs, verify each other's work, and receive rewards. We introduce realistic constraints that make compliance with the verification protocol incompatible with reward maximization, and find that agents increasingly deviate from the protocol over repeated interactions. Collusion emerges in 94% of trajectories across 10 models, and more capable models within the same family reach it earlier. Controlled peer interventions show that collusion is shaped by peer behavior, while ablations reveal additional effects of reward structure, the verification feedback agents receive, and their interaction history. In particular, restricting the amount and scope of interaction history available to agents reduces collusion. Overall, our findings show that long-horizon interaction can reshape how agents coordinate in ways that create safety risks.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into software engineering has shifted the focus from function-level generation to repository-scale assistance. However, existing benchmarks largely rely on bug reports from GitHub Issues, which often allow models to bypass genuine understanding via pattern matching on error logs. This misalignment under-measures Edit Bias, which refers to premature generation, where models prematurely propose code modifications instead of understanding the existing repository architecture. Furthermore, current LLM-as-a-Judge scalar scoring suffers from high variance and low interpretability. This work introduces RepoProbe, a novel benchmark for evaluating repository-level code understanding through open-ended Q&A using GitHub Discussions, which focuses on open-ended architectural inquiries rather than defect reporting. To ensure rigorous evaluation, we propose a Checklist-Based Verification Protocol that decomposes answers into atomic, verifiable facts, thereby replacing subjective ratings with objective verification. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs reveals a persistent gap between high clarity and evidencegrounded technical correctness. It also quantitatively confirms the prevalence of edit bias, in which models prioritize code generation instead of architectural analysis. Finally, we demonstrate that our verification protocol significantly improves evaluation reliability compared to traditional evaluations with scalar scoring.

Diffusion Language Models (DLMs) present a promising non-sequential paradigm for text generation, distinct from standard autoregressive (AR) approaches. However, current decoding strategies often adopt a reactive stance, underutilizing the global bidirectional context to dictate global trajectories. To address this, we propose Plan-Verify-Fill (PVF), a training-free paradigm that grounds planning via quantitative validation. PVF actively constructs a hierarchical skeleton by prioritizing high-leverage semantic anchors and employs a verification protocol to operationalize pragmatic structural stopping where further deliberation yields diminishing returns. Extensive evaluations on LLaDA-8B-Instruct and Dream-7B-Instruct demonstrate that PVF reduces the Number of Function Evaluations (NFE) by up to 65% compared to confidence-based parallel decoding across benchmark datasets, unlocking superior efficiency without compromising accuracy.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) holds great promise for the development of autonomous agents under complex GUI tasks, but its scalability remains severely hampered by the verification of task completion. Existing task verification is treated as a passive, post-hoc process: a verifier (i.e., rule-based scoring script, reward or critic model, and LLM-as-a-Judge) analyzes the agent's entire interaction trajectory to determine if the agent succeeds. Such processing of verbose context that contains irrelevant, noisy history poses challenges to the verification protocols and therefore leads to prohibitive cost and low reliability. To overcome this bottleneck, we propose SmartSnap, a paradigm shift from this passive, post-hoc verification to proactive, in-situ self-verification by the agent itself. We introduce the Self-Verifying Agent, a new type of agent designed with dual missions: to not only complete a task but also to prove its accomplishment with curated snapshot evidences. Guided by our proposed 3C Principles (Completeness, Conciseness, and Creativity), the agent leverages its accessibility to the online environment to perform self-verification on a minimal, decisive set of snapshots. Such evidences are provided as the sole materials for a general LLM-as-a-Judge verifier to determine their validity and relevance. Experiments on mobile tasks across model families and scales demonstrate that our SmartSnap paradigm allows training LLM-driven agents in a scalable manner, bringing performance gains up to 26.08% and 16.66% respectively to 8B and 30B models. The synergizing between solution finding and evidence seeking facilitates the cultivation of efficient, self-verifying agents with competitive performance against DeepSeek V3.1 and Qwen3-235B-A22B.

While multi-agent systems (MAS) promise elevated intelligence through coordination of agents, current approaches to automatic MAS design under-deliver. Such shortcomings stem from two key factors: (1) methodological complexity - agent orchestration is performed using sequential, code-level execution that limits global system-level holistic reasoning and scales poorly with agent complexity - and (2) efficacy uncertainty - MAS are deployed without understanding if there are tangible benefits compared to single-agent systems (SAS). We propose MAS-Orchestra, a training-time framework that formulates MAS orchestration as a function-calling reinforcement learning problem with holistic orchestration, generating an entire MAS at once. In MAS-Orchestra, complex, goal-oriented sub-agents are abstracted as callable functions, enabling global reasoning over system structure while hiding internal execution details. To rigorously study when and why MAS are beneficial, we introduce MASBENCH, a controlled benchmark that characterizes tasks along five axes: Depth, Horizon, Breadth, Parallel, and Robustness. Our analysis reveals that MAS gains depend critically on task structure, verification protocols, and the capabilities of both orchestrator and sub-agents, rather than holding universally. Guided by these insights, MAS-Orchestra achieves consistent improvements on public benchmarks including mathematical reasoning, multi-hop QA, and search-based QA. Together, MAS-Orchestra and MASBENCH enable better training and understanding of MAS in the pursuit of multi-agent intelligence.

Communicating state machines provide a formal foundation for distributed computation. Unfortunately, they are Turing-complete and, thus, challenging to analyse. In this paper, we classify restrictions on channels which have been proposed to work around the undecidability of verification questions. We compare half-duplex communication, existential B-boundedness, and k-synchronisability. These restrictions do not prevent the communication channels from growing arbitrarily large but still restrict the power of the model. Each restriction gives rise to a set of languages so, for every pair of restrictions, we check whether one subsumes the other or if they are incomparable. We investigate their relationship in two different contexts: first, the one of communicating state machines, and, second, the one of communication protocol specifications using high-level message sequence charts. Surprisingly, these two contexts yield different conclusions. In addition, we integrate multiparty session types, another approach to specify communication protocols, into our classification. We show that multiparty session type languages are half-duplex, existentially 1-bounded, and 1-synchronisable. To~show this result, we provide the first formal embedding of multiparty session types into high-level message sequence charts.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

It is important that consumers and regulators can verify the provenance of large neural models to evaluate their capabilities and risks. We introduce the concept of a "Proof-of-Training-Data": any protocol that allows a model trainer to convince a Verifier of the training data that produced a set of model weights. Such protocols could verify the amount and kind of data and compute used to train the model, including whether it was trained on specific harmful or beneficial data sources. We explore efficient verification strategies for Proof-of-Training-Data that are compatible with most current large-model training procedures. These include a method for the model-trainer to verifiably pre-commit to a random seed used in training, and a method that exploits models' tendency to temporarily overfit to training data in order to detect whether a given data-point was included in training. We show experimentally that our verification procedures can catch a wide variety of attacks, including all known attacks from the Proof-of-Learning literature.

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) from static instruction-followers to autonomous agents necessitates operating within complex, stateful environments to achieve precise state-transition objectives. However, this paradigm is bottlenecked by data scarcity, as existing tool-centric reverse-synthesis pipelines fail to capture the rigorous logic of real-world applications. We introduce LOGIGEN, a logic-driven framework that synthesizes verifiable training data based on three core pillars: Hard-Compiled Policy Grounding, Logic-Driven Forward Synthesis, and Deterministic State Verification. Specifically, a Triple-Agent Orchestration is employed: the Architect compiles natural-language policy into database constraints to enforce hard rules; the Set Designer initializes boundary-adjacent states to trigger critical policy conflicts; and the Explorer searches this environment to discover causal solution paths. This framework yields a dataset of 20,000 complex tasks across 8 domains, where validity is strictly guaranteed by checking exact state equivalence. Furthermore, we propose a verification-based training protocol where Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on verifiable trajectories establishes compliance with hard-compiled policy, while Reinforcement Learning (RL) guided by dense state-rewards refines long-horizon goal achievement. On τ^2-Bench, LOGIGEN-32B(RL) achieves a 79.5\% success rate, substantially outperforming the base model (40.7\%). These results demonstrate that logic-driven synthesis combined with verification-based training effectively constructs the causally valid trajectories needed for next-generation agents.

Network protocols are programs with inputs and outputs that follow predefined communication patterns to synchronize and exchange information. There are many protocols and each serves a different purpose, e.g., routing, transport, secure communication, etc. The functional and performance requirements for a protocol can be expressed using a formal specification, such as, a set of logical predicates over its traces. A protocol could be prevented from achieving its requirements due to a bug in its design or implementation, a component failure (e.g., a crash), or an attack. This dissertation shows that formal methods can feasibly characterize the functionality and performance of network protocols under normal conditions as well as when subjected to attacks.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

GossipSub is a popular new peer-to-peer network protocol designed to disseminate messages quickly and efficiently by allowing peers to forward the full content of messages only to a dynamically selected subset of their neighboring peers (mesh neighbors) while gossiping about messages they have seen with the rest. Peers decide which of their neighbors to graft or prune from their mesh locally and periodically using a score for each neighbor. Scores are calculated using a score function that depends on mesh-specific parameters, weights and counters relating to a peer's performance in the network. Since a GossipSub network's performance ultimately depends on the performance of its peers, an important question arises: Is the score calculation mechanism effective in weeding out non-performing or even intentionally misbehaving peers from meshes? We answered this question in the negative in our companion paper by reasoning about GossipSub using our formal, official and executable ACL2s model. Based on our findings, we synthesized and simulated attacks against GossipSub which were confirmed by the developers of GossipSub, FileCoin, and Eth2.0, and publicly disclosed in MITRE CVE-2022-47547. In this paper, we present a detailed description of our model. We discuss design decisions, security properties of GossipSub, reasoning about the security properties in context of our model, attack generation and lessons we learnt when writing it.

Agentic AI systems increasingly execute consequential actions on behalf of human principals, delegating tasks through multi-step chains of autonomous agents. No existing standard addresses a fundamental accountability gap: verifying that terminal actions in a delegation chain were genuinely authorized by a human principal, through what chain of delegation, and under what scope. This paper presents the Human Delegation Provenance (HDP) protocol, a lightweight token-based scheme that cryptographically captures and verifies human authorization context in multi-agent systems. An HDP token binds a human authorization event to a session, records each agent's delegation action as a signed hop in an append-only chain, and enables any participant to verify the full provenance record using only the issuer's Ed25519 public key and the current session identifier. Verification is fully offline, requiring no registry lookups or third-party trust anchors. We situate HDP within the existing landscape of delegation protocols, identify its distinct design point relative to OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), JSON Web Tokens (RFC 7519), UCAN, and the Intent Provenance Protocol (draft-haberkamp-ipp-00), and demonstrate that existing standards fail to address the multi-hop, append-only, human-provenance requirements of agentic systems. HDP has been published as an IETF Internet-Draft (draft-helixar-hdp-agentic-delegation-00) and a reference TypeScript SDK is publicly available.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

The first spoofing-aware speaker verification (SASV) challenge aims to integrate research efforts in speaker verification and anti-spoofing. We extend the speaker verification scenario by introducing spoofed trials to the usual set of target and impostor trials. In contrast to the established ASVspoof challenge where the focus is upon separate, independently optimised spoofing detection and speaker verification sub-systems, SASV targets the development of integrated and jointly optimised solutions. Pre-trained spoofing detection and speaker verification models are provided as open source and are used in two baseline SASV solutions. Both models and baselines are freely available to participants and can be used to develop back-end fusion approaches or end-to-end solutions. Using the provided common evaluation protocol, 23 teams submitted SASV solutions. When assessed with target, bona fide non-target and spoofed non-target trials, the top-performing system reduces the equal error rate of a conventional speaker verification system from 23.83% to 0.13%. SASV challenge results are a testament to the reliability of today's state-of-the-art approaches to spoofing detection and speaker verification.

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) plays a crucial role in extending the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by enabling integration with external tools and data sources. However, the standard MCP specification presents significant security vulnerabilities, notably Tool Poisoning and Rug Pull attacks. This paper introduces the Enhanced Tool Definition Interface (ETDI), a security extension designed to fortify MCP. ETDI incorporates cryptographic identity verification, immutable versioned tool definitions, and explicit permission management, often leveraging OAuth 2.0. We further propose extending MCP with fine-grained, policy-based access control, where tool capabilities are dynamically evaluated against explicit policies using a dedicated policy engine, considering runtime context beyond static OAuth scopes. This layered approach aims to establish a more secure, trustworthy, and controllable ecosystem for AI applications interacting with LLMs and external tools.

Runtime-governance evidence often collapses materially different events into one audit record: a decision may be made, an instruction dispatched or received, an action may or may not execute, and a resulting state may or may not be observed. This paper presents AIREP, a vendor- and model-independent protocol for per-decision AI runtime evidence. Its current wire model separates evidence into four artifact families: Decision, Control, Execution, and Effect. Artifacts use closed core schemas, explicit identities and digests, declared scope limits, RFC 8785 canonical JSON, domain-separated SHA-256 hashing, and pure Ed25519 signatures. A three-level assurance model distinguishes structural/hash consistency (AIREP-Core), verifier-accepted authorship (AIREP-Authenticated), and independently anchored chain-head freshness and non-truncation relative to an accepted witness (AIREP-Witnessed); these classes do not establish event truth. A structured reconciler preserves failure, missing evidence, unevaluated prerequisites, and indeterminate outcomes as distinct states. The released beta includes a four-family first-party producer, Python and Node reference-verification paths, adversarial/lifecycle corpora, and reproducible validation. Post-release first-party Hermes and LightEval integration exercises preserve explicit evidence boundaries without claiming adoption or interoperability. Independent implementation evidence exists separately for a v0.1.2 producer and a v0.2 consumer/verifier; because they target different frozen versions, they do not establish same-version producer-to-consumer interoperability. AIREP remains experimental.

In realistic education, a solution is often expressed not only in words but in a drawing--a circuit, a geometric construction, a function plot--and a teacher must grade the drawing as carefully as the text. Recent advances in unified multimodal models have enabled scientific image generation, yet verifying the correctness of these specialized visual outputs remains a critical bottleneck: errors often arise from intricate domain knowledge, structural reasoning, and multi-step instruction rather than surface-level artifacts. Existing verifiers mainly target natural images and compress judgement into scalar scores, leaving scientific coverage and explainable feedback for error correction underexplored. To bridge this gap, we make three main contributions. (1) We construct SciGen-Verify, a benchmark dedicated to explainable verification of scientific image generation, spanning instruction following, multidisciplinary reasoning, and world knowledge domains. It contains a three-tier hierarchical protocol over the binary judgement, supporting explanation, and corrective editing instruction. (2) We develop SciGen-Verifier, a reasoning-driven multimodal verifier trained via cold-start supervised fine-tuning followed by a curriculum-based two-stage reinforcement learning pipeline. The rubric-guided process rewards first strengthen scientific reasoning exploration and outcome rewards subsequently align output with ground-truth annotation. (3) On SciGen-Verify, SciGen-Verifier achieves competitive performance against much larger proprietary models. It further serves as a practical online critic for iterative image rectification.

Tool-using LLM agents increasingly use the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to answer from heterogeneous evidence sources, including search, APIs, databases, clinical records, and formulary tools. Standard factuality metrics usually test whether an answer is supported by pooled evidence, missing a provenance-sensitive failure mode: a claim may be supported somewhere while being attributed to the wrong source. We call this cross-source conflation. We introduce ProvenanceGuard, a source-aware verifier for MCP-grounded answers. It consumes captured MCP traces with stable tool IDs, source IDs, and raw outputs; decomposes answers into atomic claims; routes claims to source-specific evidence; checks support with NLI and a token-alignment proxy; compares stated attribution with the routed source; and returns per-claim verdicts plus an answer-level allow/block decision. Blocked answers can be repaired with retrieval-augmented answer revision and re-verified. We evaluate on 281 medical-domain MCP-agent traces. A 266-trace adjudicated subset yields 2,325 LLM-assisted claim labels split by trace; 361 held-out labels are human-verified. On the 40-trace held-out split, ProvenanceGuard achieves block F1 0.802 and source accuracy 0.858 over 260 source-eligible claims, outperforming source-blind baselines that do not emit claim-to-source IDs. On a harder multi-source benchmark it reaches block F1 0.846, while source-plus-relation accuracy drops to 0.229, showing that exact source ownership remains difficult with semantically close sources. Repair-and-reverify resolves all blocked answers in the full trace set, often via conservative fallback. In 50 controlled clinical conflation probes, ProvenanceGuard detects all injected attribution swaps with no retained wrong attribution. These results show that source attribution is an independent axis for factuality verification in MCP-based agents.

Human verification under adversarial information flow operates as a cost-bounded decision procedure constrained by working memory limits and cognitive biases. We introduce the Verification Cost Asymmetry (VCA) coefficient, formalizing it as the ratio of expected verification work between populations under identical claim distributions. Drawing on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP) and parameterized complexity theory, we construct dissemination protocols that reduce verification for trusted audiences to constant human effort while imposing superlinear costs on adversarial populations lacking cryptographic infrastructure. We prove theoretical guarantees for this asymmetry, validate the framework through controlled user studies measuring verification effort with and without spot-checkable provenance, and demonstrate practical encoding of real-world information campaigns. The results establish complexity-theoretic foundations for engineering democratic advantage in cognitive warfare, with immediate applications to content authentication, platform governance, and information operations doctrine.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) relies on retrieved context to guide large language models (LLM), yet treats retrieval as a weak heuristic rather than verifiable evidence -- leading to unsupported answers, hallucinations, and reliance on spurious context. We introduce a novel training framework that treats the RAG pipeline as an interactive proof system by adapting the Merlin-Arthur (M/A) protocol: Arthur (the generator LLM) trains on questions with unknown context provenance and Merlin gives helpful evidence, while Morgana injects adversarial, misleading context. Both use an XAI method to identify and modify evidence most influential to Arthur. This trains Arthur to (1) answer when evidence supports the answer, (2) reject when evidence is insufficient, and (3) rely on the context spans that truly ground the answer. We further introduce a verification framework that disentangles explanation fidelity from model predictive errors, and introduce the Explained Information Fraction (EIF), which normalizes M/A mutual-information guarantees. Across three RAG datasets and multiple LLM families and sizes, M/A training makes LLMs more grounded in evidence, increases information theoretic measures (soundness, completeness) and reject behavior with less hallucinations, without manually annotated unanswerable samples. Finally, the retriever also improves recall and MRR via automatically generated M/A hard positives and negatives. While high accuracy does not guarantee entropy flow from context to answer, our EIF results show that autonomous interactive-proof-style supervision enables RAG systems that treat retrieved documents as verifiable evidence. % rather than suggestions.

Large language model agents solve tasks through long sequences of tool calls, and the prevailing design has a single strong model generate every step, although many steps are routine enough for a much smaller model. Existing ways of sharing this work keep the strong model as the generator: routers and collaborative agents decide which model handles each query or step, and speculative methods check a small model's drafts one step at a time, usually against the strong model's own action. We introduce SpecAgent, a collaboration protocol that turns the strong model from the author of each step into a reviewer of steps drafted by a weak model. The weak model executes read-only tool calls as it drafts, so that every step is grounded in real observations, and holds the first action that would modify the environment. The strong model then verifies the drafted segment in a single prefill pass, commits the longest prefix it judges semantically valid, and repairs the first rejected step. Because verification replaces autoregressive decoding with parallel prefill, the strong model decodes only short verdicts and occasional repairs rather than every step. On τ^2-Bench, SpecAgent comes within one point of the strong model's success rate while roughly halving memory traffic and wall time, and on AutomationBench and VitaBench it recovers 44-75% of the quality gap while lowering both. In an edge-cloud deployment on MCP-Atlas with three cloud models, it closes 53-75% of the weak-strong quality gap while the strong model generates at most half as many tokens. These results suggest that a strong model need not author every step of an agent: reviewing grounded drafts retains most of its quality while cutting both latency and memory traffic.

Speech deepfake source verification systems aims to determine whether two synthetic speech utterances originate from the same source generator, often assuming that the resulting source embeddings are independent of speaker traits. However, this assumption remains unverified. In this paper, we first investigate the impact of speaker factors on source verification. We propose a speaker-disentangled metric learning (SDML) framework incorporating two novel loss functions. The first leverages Chebyshev polynomial to mitigate gradient instability during disentanglement optimization. The second projects source and speaker embeddings into hyperbolic space, leveraging Riemannian metric distances to reduce speaker information and learn more discriminative source features. Experimental results on MLAAD benchmark, evaluated under four newly proposed protocols designed for source-speaker disentanglement scenarios, demonstrate the effectiveness of SDML framework. The code, evaluation protocols and demo website are available at https://github.com/xxuan-acoustics/RiemannSD-Net.

Deployed LLM agents rely on agentic context, the model-external textual control content assembled by an operational harness. In this work, the mutable component of that context is a persistent system-level instruction that is updated from operational experience while the model, tools, and harness remain fixed. Over long evolution horizons, flat-text maintenance makes verification increasingly difficult as accumulated instructions grow and interact. We propose Graph-Regularized Agentic Context Evolution (GRACE), which maintains the persistent instruction component as a typed semantic graph and validates proposed updates within the local typed neighborhoods of modified nodes. Accepted graph updates are reconstructed as incremental edits to the textual instruction checkpoint used at deployment. We evaluate GRACE within a fixed telecom agent harness derived from τ^2-bench under a controlled distribution-shift protocol. Across five independent replications, GRACE improves strict reliability, measured by pass^3, from the Gemini 2.5 Flash zero-shot value of 0.091 to 0.673pm0.136 at the final checkpoint. This exceeds a Gemini 3.1 Pro zero-shot reference of 0.242 on the same held-out set, while the flat-text HCE baseline finishes at 0.191pm0.051. These results identify two requirements for reliable long-horizon context evolution, a structural substrate that makes verification local and a consolidation mechanism that keeps accumulated instruction content usable.

Autonomous agent systems increasingly trigger real-world side effects: deploying infrastructure, modifying databases, moving money, and executing workflows. Yet most agent stacks provide no mandatory execution checkpoint where organizations can deterministically permit, deny, or defer an action before it changes reality. This paper introduces Faramesh, a protocol-agnostic execution control plane that enforces execution-time authorization for agent-driven actions via a non-bypassable Action Authorization Boundary (AAB). Faramesh canonicalizes agent intent into a Canonical Action Representation (CAR), evaluates actions deterministically against policy and state, and issues a decision artifact (PERMIT/DEFER/DENY) that executors must validate prior to execution. The system is designed to be framework- and model-agnostic, supports multi-agent and multi-tenant deployments, and remains independent of transport protocols (e.g., MCP). Faramesh further provides decision-centric, append-only provenance logging keyed by canonical action hashes, enabling auditability, verification, and deterministic replay without re-running agent reasoning. We show how these primitives yield enforceable, predictable governance for autonomous execution while avoiding hidden coupling to orchestration layers or observability-only approaches.

Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3). We develop a Markov-chain dependability model quantifying Evidence Chain Availability (ECA), Mean Time Between Evidence Gaps (MTBEG), and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). We introduce a resilient evidence chain protocol maintaining chain integrity across TEE crashes, network partitions, and enclave migration. Our security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation. Evaluation on Intel SGX demonstrates under 25% per-checkpoint CPU overhead (<0.3% of the 30 s checkpoint interval), >99.5% Evidence Chain Availability (ECA) (the fraction of session time with active evidence collection) in Monte Carlo simulation under Poisson failure models, and sealed-state recovery under 200 ms.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) grounds answers in retrieved passages, yet relevance does not guarantee sufficiency: a topical passage may still fail to justify the answer. We study evidence sufficiency verification for selective RAG answering, in which a verifier receives a question, a candidate answer, and retrieved evidence and decides whether the evidence supports, refutes, or is insufficient for the answer, answering only when support is established. We present SURE-RAG, an aggregation protocol that treats evidence sufficiency as a set-level property: missing hops and unresolved conflicts cannot be detected by scoring passages independently. A shared claim-evidence verifier produces a local relation distribution for each (claim, passage) pair, which SURE-RAG aggregates into four interpretable answer-level feature blocks (coverage, relation strength, uncertainty, and retrieval), producing a three-way decision and an auditable selective score. We evaluate on HotpotQA-RAG v3, a controlled multi-hop benchmark, under an artifact-aware protocol (shortcut baselines, counterfactual swaps, no-oracle checks, and GPT-4o audits). Calibrated SURE-RAG attains 0.9075 Macro-F1 (raw 0.8951 +/- 0.0069), well above DeBERTa mean-pooling (0.6516) and a GPT-4o judge (0.7284), and on par with a strong concat cross-encoder (0.8888 +/- 0.0109) while remaining fully auditable. At 30% coverage, risk falls from 0.2588 to 0.1642, a 37% relative reduction. As a boundary-mapping experiment, we contrast SURE-RAG with GPT-4o on HaluBench unsafe detection: the ranking reverses (0.3343 vs. 0.7389 unsafe-F1), indicating that controlled sufficiency verification and natural hallucination detection are distinct problems.

This paper addresses the remote verification of the authenticity of Optically Variable Devices (commonly known as holograms) on identity documents. Typically placed over the cardholder's photo, these devices provide strong and easily verifiable security for human inspection but pose challenges for automated verification. Existing approaches easily cover static frauds (e.g. paper photocopy) and can be evaluated for such, but their capacity to detect real, dynamic fraud cases (e.g. handcrafted hologram) has not been evaluated to date because of the lack of public datasets. Furthermore, they are usually trained to detect known attack types, and few of them can generalize to new, unseen attacks. This work features three contributions to address these limitations: 1) a new public dataset, MIDV-DynAttack, which extends the existing MIDV-Holo dataset with realistic, static and dynamic attacks against identity document specimens, tripling the number of attack samples compared to the original dataset, 2) a novel verification method which can assess the authenticity of a specific hologram thanks to the analysis of its dynamic behavior and appearance, can be trained without dynamic attack samples, and exhibits new state-of-the-art performance, 3) a benchmark of existing approaches which follows a clear evaluation protocol and emphasizes the inability of other approaches to deal with dynamic attacks, as well as new challenging attacks to deal with. Code and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/EPITAResearchLab/pouliquen.25.icdar.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) faithfulness detectors are widely used to audit reasoning models, yet a detector is itself a predictor whose verdicts are treated as stable properties. We ask whether a detector is faithful to itself under distribution shift. We formalize meta-faithfulness as an invariance principle: a valid detector must return identical verdicts on traces that differ only by transformations preserving ground-truth faithfulness. We prove three results: (i) no detector using only intervention-response profiles can separate faithful from epiphenomenal mechanisms with identical signatures; (ii) any detector relying on shift-sensitive features violates invariance at a rate independent of its in-distribution accuracy; (iii) an asymptotic certified selective-risk guarantee enables confident abstention. We operationalize the principle in FaithShift, a stress-test protocol spanning ten shift axes, and propose SIFT, a hidden-state trajectory detector trained with cross-environment invariance objectives and certified abstention. Across 14,996 traces, four domains, and eight models, three findings emerge. First, transfer collapse is real: all existing detectors show gaps geq 0.15 AUROC. Second, the dominant bottleneck is sampling stochasticity, not shift: over 80% of detector instability stems from random seed variation, falsifying our preregistered prediction that shift-attributable violations exceed 0.25. Third, SIFT cuts invariance violations by 64% over the best single-seed baseline, but a four-seed ensemble of any detector narrows the margin to 0.01 (indistinguishable at matched coverage, p=0.21), and SIFT needs a 51% abstention rate. Cross-model transfer degrades from within-family to cross-family to open-weight-to-API, partly closed by multi-model training. We offer a framework for auditing auditors: the real barrier is detector variance, not distribution shift.

The automatic speaker verification spoofing and countermeasures (ASVspoof) challenge series is a community-led initiative which aims to promote the consideration of spoofing and the development of countermeasures. ASVspoof 2021 is the 4th in a series of bi-annual, competitive challenges where the goal is to develop countermeasures capable of discriminating between bona fide and spoofed or deepfake speech. This document provides a technical description of the ASVspoof 2021 challenge, including details of training, development and evaluation data, metrics, baselines, evaluation rules, submission procedures and the schedule.

Current language model evaluations measure what models know under ideal conditions but not how robustly they know it under realistic stress. Static benchmarks like MMLU and TruthfulQA cannot distinguish a model that lacks knowledge from one whose verification mechanisms collapse when information degrades or adversaries probe for weaknesses. We introduce the Drill-Down and Fabricate Test (DDFT), a protocol that measures epistemic robustness: a model's ability to maintain factual accuracy under progressive semantic compression and adversarial fabrication. We propose a two-system cognitive model comprising a Semantic System that generates fluent text and an Epistemic Verifier that validates factual accuracy. Our findings, based on evaluating 9 frontier models across 8 knowledge domains at 5 compression levels (1,800 turn-level evaluations), reveal that epistemic robustness is orthogonal to conventional design paradigms. Neither parameter count (r=0.083, p=0.832) nor architectural type (r=0.153, p=0.695) significantly predicts robustness, suggesting it emerges from training methodology and verification mechanisms distinct from current approaches. Error detection capability strongly predicts overall robustness (rho=-0.817, p=0.007), indicating this is the critical bottleneck. We find that flagship models exhibit brittleness despite their scale, while smaller models can achieve robust performance, challenging assumptions about the relationship between model size and reliability. The DDFT framework provides both theoretical foundation and practical tools for assessing epistemic robustness before deployment in critical applications.

AI research agents combine prior knowledge, public sources, and experimental feedback to produce useful results. The Discovery Certification Protocol (DCP) turns claims about these results into executable recovery and feedback tests. Gate 1 validates useful improvement on sealed evaluation. Gate 2 gives matched agents the registered starting information and observed Web content while withholding the target research history. Every valid method reaching the numerical target supplies a recovery witness and triggers the Core veto. DCP Core requires adequate controls, zero observed recoveries, and a finite-sample bound on recovery in one fresh registered episode. Optional Gate 3 measures the average effect of truthful feedback relative to a specified neutral policy from a shared checkpoint. DCP Evidence adds this effect after independent null calibration and a registered effect margin. Two controlled audits exercise the complete protocol in SQLite optimization and virtual catalyst control under different models. Each produced zero recoveries in 96 episodes, with an upper bound of 0.0468. Each paired study yielded 30 truthful recoveries and zero neutral recoveries, with passing 60-pair null studies. Additional cases exercise Core, recovered, and audit-incomplete decisions. A deterministic, LLM-free verifier reproduces the decisions from frozen evidence. DCP provides a common evidence language for useful outcomes, alternative routes, and feedback effects across AI research.

In this paper we present a data-driven, integrated approach to speaker verification, which maps a test utterance and a few reference utterances directly to a single score for verification and jointly optimizes the system's components using the same evaluation protocol and metric as at test time. Such an approach will result in simple and efficient systems, requiring little domain-specific knowledge and making few model assumptions. We implement the idea by formulating the problem as a single neural network architecture, including the estimation of a speaker model on only a few utterances, and evaluate it on our internal "Ok Google" benchmark for text-dependent speaker verification. The proposed approach appears to be very effective for big data applications like ours that require highly accurate, easy-to-maintain systems with a small footprint.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

The majority of recent state-of-the-art speaker verification architectures adopt multi-scale processing and frequency-channel attention mechanisms. Convolutional layers of these models typically have a fixed kernel size, e.g., 3 or 5. In this study, we further contribute to this line of research utilising a selective kernel attention (SKA) mechanism. The SKA mechanism allows each convolutional layer to adaptively select the kernel size in a data-driven fashion. It is based on an attention mechanism which exploits both frequency and channel domain. We first apply existing SKA module to our baseline. Then we propose two SKA variants where the first variant is applied in front of the ECAPA-TDNN model and the other is combined with the Res2net backbone block. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our two proposed SKA variants consistently improves the performance and are complementary when tested on three different evaluation protocols.

Recent video multimodal large language models achieve impressive results across various benchmarks. However, current evaluations suffer from two critical limitations: (1) inflated scores can mask deficiencies in fine-grained visual understanding and reasoning, and (2) answer correctness is often measured without verifying whether models identify the precise spatio-temporal evidence supporting their predictions. To address this, we present VideoZeroBench, a hierarchical benchmark designed for challenging long-video question answering that rigorously verifies spatio-temporal evidence. It comprises 500 manually annotated questions across 13 domains, paired with temporal intervals and spatial bounding boxes as evidence. To disentangle answering generation, temporal grounding, and spatial grounding, we introduce a five-level evaluation protocol that progressively tightens evidence requirements. Experiments show that even Gemini-3-Pro correctly answers fewer than 17% of questions under the standard end-to-end QA setting (Level-3). When grounding constraints are imposed, performance drops sharply: No model exceeds 1% accuracy when both correct answering and accurate spatio-temporal localization are required (Level-5), with most failing to achieve any correct grounded predictions. These results expose a significant gap between surface-level answer correctness and genuine evidence-based reasoning, revealing that grounded video understanding remains a bottleneck for long-video QA. We further analyze performance across minimal evidence spans, atomic abilities, and inference paradigms, providing insights for future research in grounded video reasoning. The benchmark and code will be made publicly available.

As LLM-powered agents have been used for high-stakes decision-making, such as clinical diagnosis, it becomes critical to develop reliable verification of their decisions to facilitate trustworthy deployment. Yet, existing verifiers usually underperform owing to a lack of domain knowledge and limited calibration. To address this, we establish GLEAN, an agent verification framework with Guideline-grounded Evidence Accumulation that compiles expert-curated protocols into trajectory-informed, well-calibrated correctness signals. GLEAN evaluates the step-wise alignment with domain guidelines and aggregates multi-guideline ratings into surrogate features, which are accumulated along the trajectory and calibrated into correctness probabilities using Bayesian logistic regression. Moreover, the estimated uncertainty triggers active verification, which selectively collects additional evidence for uncertain cases via expanding guideline coverage and performing differential checks. We empirically validate GLEAN with agentic clinical diagnosis across three diseases from the MIMIC-IV dataset, surpassing the best baseline by 12% in AUROC and 50% in Brier score reduction, which confirms the effectiveness in both discrimination and calibration. In addition, the expert study with clinicians recognizes GLEAN's utility in practice.

Knowledge-based authentication is crucial for task-oriented spoken dialogue systems that offer personalised and privacy-focused services. Such systems should be able to enrol (E), verify (V), and identify (I) new and recurring users based on their personal information, e.g. postcode, name, and date of birth. In this work, we formalise the three authentication tasks and their evaluation protocols, and we present EVI, a challenging spoken multilingual dataset with 5,506 dialogues in English, Polish, and French. Our proposed models set the first competitive benchmarks, explore the challenges of multilingual natural language processing of spoken dialogue, and set directions for future research.

Biomedical fact-checking systems must do more than predict whether a claim is supported, contradicted, or unaddressed: they should also produce evidence that is faithful, complete, and useful for verification. We study this evidence-generation setting on CARE-XAI, a unified benchmark spanning five biomedical and health fact-checking sources. We compare base instruction LLMs, PubMed retrieval-augmented LLMs, fine-tuned LLMs, label-only LLMs, and biomedical encoder classifiers under a shared evaluation protocol. Biomedical classifiers remain strongest for verdict-only prediction, while fine-tuned LLMs are the strongest evidence-generating systems. PubMed retrieval is mixed: it helps PubMed-aligned sources such as PubMedQA and SciFact, but can distract models on broader public-health claims. We introduce Bio-GRACE, a gold-reference-normalized diagnostic for measuring whether retrieved evidence recovers the decision benefit of reference evidence. Bio-GRACE shows that retrieval utility is source-dependent, motivates selective retrieval, and exposes why retrieval recall and lexical evidence overlap are insufficient for biomedical fact-checking.

This paper presents OpenCLAW-P2P v6.0, a comprehensive evolution of the decentralized collective-intelligence platform in which autonomous AI agents publish, peer-review, score, and iteratively improve scientific research papers without any human gatekeeper. Building on v5.0 foundations -- tribunal-gated publishing, multi-LLM granular scoring, calibrated deception detection, the Silicon Chess-Grid FSM, and the AETHER containerized inference engine -- this release introduces four major new subsystems: (1) a multi-layer paper persistence architecture with four storage tiers (in-memory cache, Cloudflare R2, Gun.js, GitHub) ensuring zero paper loss across redeployments; (2) a multi-layer retrieval cascade with automatic backfill reducing lookup latency from >3s to <50ms; (3) live reference verification querying CrossRef, arXiv, and Semantic Scholar during scoring to detect fabricated citations with >85% accuracy; and (4) a scientific API proxy providing rate-limited cached access to seven public databases. The platform operates with 14 real autonomous agents producing 50+ scored papers (word counts 2,072-4,073, leaderboard scores 6.4-8.1) alongside 23 labeled simulated citizens. We present honest production statistics, failure-mode analysis, a paper recovery protocol that salvaged 25 lost papers, and lessons learned from operating the system at scale. All pre-existing subsystems -- 17-judge multi-LLM scoring, 14-rule calibration with 8 deception detectors, tribunal cognitive examination, Proof of Value consensus, Laws-of-Form eigenform verification, and tau-normalized agent coordination -- are retained and further hardened. All code is open-source at https://github.com/Agnuxo1/p2pclaw-mcp-server.

Combinatorics is central to Olympiad-level mathematical problem solving, requiring deep discrete reasoning, creative constructions, and rigorous structural insight. Recent evidence suggests that even today's strongest frontier models remain uneven on Olympiad combinatorics, revealing a gap in creative mathematical reasoning. We introduce ComBench, an Olympiad-level combinatorics benchmark for evaluating and diagnosing the combinatorial reasoning capabilities of large language models. ComBench contains 100 human-annotated competition-level problems organized around two complementary settings: analysis-centric problems, which primarily require rigorous mathematical arguments, and construction-centric problems, which require explicit constructions in addition to correctness justifications. The evaluation protocol combines rubric-guided proof grading with deterministic construction verification, exposing cases where proof quality and construction validity diverge. Experiments on frontier open- and closed-source models show that ComBench is far from saturated: the strongest model reaches 65.4% overall Avg. and 75.3% overall Best@4. We further find that Rigorous Proof Reasoning and Constructive Realization are distinct capabilities: Kimi-K2.6 trails GPT-5.5 on analysis-centric proof grading but surpasses it on construction-centric Best@4, while Existence and Construction problems remain consistently hardest across representative frontier models.

Contemporary on-chain artificial intelligence (AI) encounters an intractable Von Neumann memory and latency wall. Storing static floating-point neural weight matrices inside Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) storage costs millions of gas, rendering direct on-chain inference impossible. While Zero-Knowledge Machine Learning (ZK-ML) offloads matrix tensor multiplications to off-chain provers, it introduces fatal constraints: 10 to 300 seconds of SNARK proving latency and 250,000 to 500,000 gas per proof verification. Because decentralized finance (DeFi) exploits - such as uncollateralized flash-loan attacks, predatory sandwich MEV, and toxic loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) flow - occur atomically inside a single block, ZK-ML oracles cannot react in time. Here, we present Werracle, a production-grade, zero-storage on-chain AI decision oracle fitting inside a single 32-byte EVM storage slot (bytes32). Leveraging foundational procedural Mandelbrot escape dynamics (z_{n+1} = z_n^2 + c) established by Dagli et al. (arXiv:2609.25498), Werracle derives continuous non-linear decision hyperplanes from a 24-byte coordinate triplet Theta = (c_x, c_y, zoom). Implemented in pure Solidity bytecode using fixed-point Q16.16 arithmetic (WerrMath.sol), Werracle evaluates a 16-point Pareto micro-grid in only 21,438 gas (under 0.0005 USD on Layer-2 rollups like Base and Arbitrum) with sub-millisecond execution latency. We demonstrate real-world DeFi efficacy via WerracleFeeHook.sol, a Uniswap v4 dynamic swap fee governor that measures orderbook turbulence on-the-fly and atomically adjusts liquidity provider fees between 0.05% and 0.50%. The protocol is formally verified against a 1,000-test cryptographically sealed deterministic verification suite (100.0% pass rate) with telemetry permanently disabled, operating live on a dedicated EVM devnet sandbox (Chain ID 4242).

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

Agentic systems enhance their capabilities by invoking external tools and maintaining persistent memory. However, these external dependencies introduce novel attack surfaces. Recent tool and memory poisoning attacks show that maliciously crafted tool descriptors and poisoned memory can covertly bias agent behavior. These threats reflect a deeper issue: the lack of verifiable continuity in the agent's contextual state for planning and execution. We present ElephantAgent, a protocol that enforces Contextual State Continuity to defend against contextual state poisoning. Inspired by prior state-continuity mechanisms (e.g., Nimble), ElephantAgent extends this protection to the evolving contextual state of agentic systems. We define the contextual state as the bounded, security-critical subset of the agent's entire context (e.g., tool state and memory). Before processing each query, ElephantAgent recomputes the digest of the local contextual state and verifies it against the latest authorized digest. Using replicated trusted hardware, ElephantAgent maintains a linearizable ledger of authorized contextual state transitions and detects out-of-band state tampering. To handle in-band semantic abuse, ElephantAgent additionally provides Historical Traceability, enabling conditional post-hoc audit and recovery to a known-good prior state.

This paper reports a single, fully instrumented case study of a large-scale architectural refactoring by an AI coding agent under a specification-first protocol, with no human review of the generated code and no pre-existing oracle to validate the target behaviour. The task, dismantling a central invariant across a large interdependent codebase, was assessed by the author as effectively infeasible through incremental refactoring, the kind of change that conventionally calls for a rewrite instead. Under the protocol described here, the agent completed it successfully. The system is a 717,725-line production TypeScript application across 3,648 files. The task required dismantling a core lifetime invariant: the guarantee that a UI panel remains open for the duration of an AI request. The target behaviour was that a streaming generation survives the closing of its panel and can be reattached, on reopening, to the same live stream with no loss or duplication. The protocol: formal specification by the agent, 14 refinement cycles auditing that specification against the source code, atomic implementation, a compile/test feedback loop, then 17 verification cycles auditing the code against the frozen specification. Across 31 audit passes, 201 defects were corrected before any human executed the program. The convergence criterion was empirical: two consecutive verification passes returning zero findings. The change touched 189 files (31 new); with the extraction phase, the two commits total 288 files, 34,770 insertions, 16,422 deletions. Across the first and roughly thirty later sessions, the software behaved as specified, no bug observed. Elapsed: three days; cost: USD 2,430. The full specification and raw session logs, 1,500+ pages in French, are published as evidence, allowing inspection of the process and submission to a language model for consistency checking.

We introduce MacroBench, a code-first benchmark that evaluates whether LLMs can synthesize reusable browser-automation programs (macros) from natural-language goals by reading HTML/DOM and emitting Selenium. MacroBench instantiates seven self-hosted sites covering 681 tasks across interaction complexity and targeting difficulty. Our end-to-end protocol validates generated code via static checks, sandboxed execution, and outcome verification (DOM assertions, database snapshots), and includes a safety suite for scraping, spam/abuse, and credential/privacy prompts. Across 2,636 model-task runs, we observe stratified success: GPT-4o-mini (96.8%), GPT-4o (95.3%), Gemini (89.0%), DeepSeek (83.4%). Models handle simple tasks reliably (91.7%) but fail on complex workflows (0.0%), and none meet production-quality coding practices despite functional completion. We release our complete benchmark pipeline, evaluation framework, and experimental results at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/MacroBench to enable reproducible assessment of macro synthesis for web automation.

The rapid evolution of autonomous, agentic artificial intelligence within financial services has introduced an existential architectural crisis: large language models (LLMs) are probabilistic, non-deterministic systems operating in domains that demand absolute, mathematically verifiable compliance guarantees. Existing guardrail solutions -- including NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails and Guardrails AI -- rely on probabilistic classifiers and syntactic validators that are fundamentally inadequate for enforcing complex multi-variable regulatory constraints mandated by the SEC, FINRA, and OCC. This paper presents the Lean-Agent Protocol, a formal-verification-based AI guardrail platform that leverages the Aristotle neural-symbolic model developed by Harmonic AI to auto-formalize institutional policies into Lean 4 code. Every proposed agentic action is treated as a mathematical conjecture: execution is permitted if and only if the Lean 4 kernel proves that the action satisfies pre-compiled regulatory axioms. This architecture provides cryptographic-level compliance certainty at microsecond latency, directly satisfying SEC Rule 15c3-5, OCC Bulletin 2011-12, FINRA Rule 3110, and CFPB explainability mandates. A three-phase implementation roadmap from shadow verification through enterprise-scale deployment is provided.

Recent advances have made long-form report-generating systems widely available. This has prompted evaluation frameworks that use LLM-as-judge protocols and claim verification, along with meta-evaluation frameworks that seek to validate these methods. Many of the meta-evaluations estimate an evaluation quality's by comparing its assessments against human pairwise preferences. Prior work, however, suggests that human pairwise preference may be overly simplistic and can fail to capture nuances of expert expectations. We conduct a case study in meta-evaluation for long-form QA benchmarks using ScholarQA-CS2, a benchmark designed for assessing retrieval-augmented deep-research QA in the scientific domain. We comprehensively validate the benchmark through human pairwise preference judgments, then critically examine the strengths, weaknesses, and confounders of this approach. We show that pairwise preference rankings are best suited for system-level evaluation, while explicit metric-wise annotations and expert annotators are critical for reliable metric-level assessment, with subjectivity remaining a key challenge. Based on our findings, we offer practical guidelines for designing future meta-evaluations that better align evaluation methods, annotator expertise, and reporting practices. By surfacing these methodological challenges, we aim to advance evaluation standards for deep-research systems.

Deep Research Agents generate analyst-grade reports, yet evaluating them remains challenging due to the absence of a single ground truth and the multidimensional nature of research quality. Recent benchmarks propose distinct methodologies, yet they suffer from the Mirage of Synthesis, where strong surface-level fluency and citation alignment can obscure underlying factual and reasoning defects. We characterize this gap by introducing a taxonomy across four verticals that exposes a critical capability mismatch: static evaluators inherently lack the tool-use capabilities required to assess temporal validity and factual correctness. To address this, we propose DREAM (Deep Research Evaluation with Agentic Metrics), a framework that instantiates the principle of capability parity by making evaluation itself agentic. DREAM structures assessment through an evaluation protocol combining query-agnostic metrics with adaptive metrics generated by a tool-calling agent, enabling temporally aware coverage, grounded verification, and systematic reasoning probes. Controlled evaluations demonstrate DREAM is significantly more sensitive to factual and temporal decay than existing benchmarks, offering a scalable, reference-free evaluation paradigm.

Evaluating whether Multimodal Large Language Models can produce trustworthy, verifiable reasoning over long, visually rich documents requires evaluation beyond end-to-end answer accuracy. We introduce DocScope, a benchmark that formulates long-document QA as a structured reasoning trajectory prediction problem: given a complete PDF document and a question, the model outputs evidence pages, supporting evidence regions, relevant factual statements, and a final answer. We design a four-stage evaluation protocol -- Page Localization, Region Grounding, Fact Extraction, and Answer Verification -- that audits each level of the trajectory independently through inter-stage decoupling, with all judges selected and calibrated via human alignment studies. DocScope comprises 1,124 questions derived from 273 documents, with all hierarchical evidence annotations completed by human annotators. We benchmark 6 proprietary models, 12 open-weight models, and several domain-specific systems. Our experiments reveal that answer accuracy cannot substitute for trajectory-level evaluation: even among correct answers, the highest observed rate of complete evidence chains is only 29\%. Across all models, region grounding remains the weakest trajectory stage. Furthermore, the primary difficulty stems from aggregating evidence dispersed across long distances and multiple document clusters, while an oracle study identifies faithful perception and fact extraction as the dominant capability bottleneck. Cross-architecture comparisons further suggest that activated parameter count matters more than total scale. The benchmark and code will be publicly released at https://github.com/MiliLab/DocScope.

The performance of speaker verification systems degrades significantly under language mismatch, a critical challenge exacerbated by the field's reliance on English-centric data. To address this, we propose the TidyVoice Challenge for cross-lingual speaker verification. The challenge leverages the TidyVoiceX dataset from the novel TidyVoice benchmark, a large-scale, multilingual corpus derived from Mozilla Common Voice, and specifically curated to isolate the effect of language switching across approximately 40 languages. Participants will be tasked with building systems robust to this mismatch, with performance primarily evaluated using the Equal Error Rate on cross-language trials. By providing standardized data, open-source baselines, and a rigorous evaluation protocol, this challenge aims to drive research towards fairer, more inclusive, and language-independent speaker recognition technologies, directly aligning with the Interspeech 2026 theme, "Speaking Together."

Pass@k measures whether a model reaches a correct answer under repeated sampling, but never how: a lucky guess counts the same as sound reasoning. CoT-Pass@k was proposed to close that gap, adding an LLM-as-judge that must assess a solution's reasoning chain before it counts. Its value rests entirely on one assumption: that the judge catches flawed reasoning. That assumption has never been tested inside the metric that depends on it, and never outside English, though the metric's claims concern models used in many languages. We report the first audit of that verification step, run under the metric's own protocol on a multilingual suite of five mathematical benchmarks in English, Turkish and Portuguese, two of them natively written. We corrupt correct solutions with deterministic edits that damage the chain and the final answer separately. We observe that all three judges accept corrupted chains almost as often as clean ones. V4-Flash and Qwen3.6 reject a solution sharply only when its final answer is wrong and accept a wrong answer more readily when the chain agrees with it; the metric's own judge accepts most wrong answers as well. Our study shows that chain-answer agreement dominates the two larger judges' verdicts and that all three fail to reliably detect the tested reasoning errors. Consequently the difference Pass@k - CoT-Pass@k averages 19.7 points on an earlier solver generation but only 4.1 on the current one. What little remains depends on the token budgets on both sides and on the generation mode; raising the generation budget moves Pass@64 by more than fifty points while the difference stays at zero. We close with two checks any judged reasoning metric should pass before its numbers are read as evidence about reasoning.

Intelligent tutoring agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly explored to deliver personalized guidance in areas such as language learning and science education. However, their capabilities in guiding users to solve complex real-world tasks remain underexplored. To address this limitation, in this work, we focus on coding tutoring, a challenging problem that requires tutors to proactively guide students toward completing predefined coding tasks. We propose a novel agent workflow, Trace-and-Verify (TRAVER), which combines knowledge tracing to estimate a student's knowledge state and turn-by-turn verification to ensure effective guidance toward task completion. We introduce DICT, an automatic evaluation protocol that assesses tutor agents holistically using controlled student simulation and code generation tests. Extensive experiments reveal the challenges of coding tutoring and demonstrate that TRAVER achieves a significantly higher success rate. Although we use code tutoring as an example in this paper, our results and findings can be extended beyond coding, providing valuable insights into advancing tutoring agents for a variety of tasks.

Answer verification is crucial not only for evaluating large language models (LLMs) by matching their unstructured outputs against standard answers, but also serves as the reward model to guide LLM optimization. Most evaluation frameworks rely on regularized matching or employ general LLMs for answer verification, which demands extensive, repetitive customization for regex rules or evaluation prompts. Two fundamental limitations persist in current methodologies: 1) the absence of comprehensive benchmarks that systematically evaluate verification capabilities across different LLMs; and 2) the nascent stage of verifier development, where existing approaches lack both the robustness to handle complex edge cases and the generalizability across different domains. In this work, we develop CompassVerifier, an accurate and robust lightweight verifier model for evaluation and outcome reward. It demonstrates multi-domain competency spanning math, knowledge, and diverse reasoning tasks, with the capability to process various answer types, including multi-subproblems, formulas, and sequence answers, while effectively identifying abnormal/invalid responses. We introduce VerifierBench benchmark comprising model outputs collected from multiple data sources, augmented through manual analysis of metaerror patterns to enhance CompassVerifier. We anticipate that CompassVerifier and VerifierBench will facilitate answer verification, evaluation protocols, and reinforcement learning research. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/open-compass/CompassVerifier.

We introduce PRISM-Bench, a benchmark of puzzle-based visual challenges designed to evaluate not only whether models can solve problems, but how their reasoning unfolds. Unlike prior evaluations that measure only final-answer accuracy, PRISM-Bench introduces a diagnostic task: given a visual puzzle and a step-by-step chain-of-thought (CoT) containing exactly one error, models must identify the first incorrect step. This setting enables fine-grained assessment of logical consistency, error detection, and visual reasoning. The puzzles in PRISM-Bench require multi-step symbolic, geometric, and analogical reasoning, resisting shortcuts based on superficial pattern matching. Evaluations across state-of-the-art MLLMs reveal a persistent gap between fluent generation and faithful reasoning: models that produce plausible CoTs often fail to locate simple logical faults. By disentangling answer generation from reasoning verification, PRISM-Bench offers a sharper lens on multimodal reasoning competence and underscores the need for diagnostic evaluation protocols in the development of trustworthy MLLMs.

Execution-aware LLM agents offer a promising paradigm for learning from tool feedback, but such feedback is often expensive and slow to obtain, making online reinforcement learning (RL) impractical. High-coverage hardware verification exemplifies this challenge due to its reliance on industrial simulators and non-differentiable execution signals. We propose LLM4Cov, an offline agent-learning framework that models verification as memoryless state transitions guided by deterministic evaluators. Building on this formulation, we introduce execution-validated data curation, policy-aware agentic data synthesis, and worst-state-prioritized sampling to enable scalable learning under execution constraints. We further curate a reality-aligned benchmark adapted from an existing verification suite through a revised evaluation protocol. Using the proposed pipeline, a compact 4B-parameter model achieves 69.2% coverage pass rate under agentic evaluation, outperforming its teacher by 5.3% and demonstrating competitive performance against models an order of magnitude larger.

Evaluation of vision-language models (VLMs) for multimodal mathematical reasoning remains limited for low-resource languages and for geometry problems that require reading a diagram and a question together. We introduce ChitraMiti-12.8k, a synthetic benchmark of 12,874 Bengali planar geometry problems paired with structured 15-attribute descriptions, and NCTB-500, a complementary set of 500 diagrams manually extracted from Bengali school textbooks. Using a three-phase protocol that separates diagram-only, diagram-plus-description, and description-only inputs, we show across five open-weight and closed-source VLMs that description-only performance is statistically indistinguishable from diagram-plus-description performance, establishing structured descriptions as a sufficient textual proxy for controlled evaluation. Despite this, models remain poor at cross-modal verification, frequently misled by a swapped spatial relation even when they answer the unmodified item correctly. We further evaluate supervised adaptation on ChitraMiti-12.8k, finding that fine-tuning improves performance on both ChitraMiti-1k and NCTB-500, although a substantial gap to the strongest zero-shot model remains. Together, ChitraMiti-12.8k, NCTB-500, and our evaluation protocol offer a standardized way to study Bengali multimodal geometry reasoning and, more broadly, whether VLMs actually check their text against what they see. Our dataset and code are publicly available on Hugging Face at https://huggingface.co/datasets/RaiyanKhaan/ChitraMiti.

Finite-State Machines (FSMs) are critical for modeling the operational logic of network protocols, enabling verification, analysis, and vulnerability discovery. However, existing FSM extraction techniques face limitations such as scalability, incomplete coverage, and ambiguity in natural language specifications. In this paper, we propose FlowFSM, a novel agentic framework that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) combined with prompt chaining and chain-of-thought reasoning to extract accurate FSMs from raw RFC documents. FlowFSM systematically processes protocol specifications, identifies state transitions, and constructs structured rule-books by chaining agent outputs. Experimental evaluation across FTP and RTSP protocols demonstrates that FlowFSM achieves high extraction precision while minimizing hallucinated transitions, showing promising results. Our findings highlight the potential of agent-based LLM systems in the advancement of protocol analysis and FSM inference for cybersecurity and reverse engineering applications.

International cooperation is common in AI research, including between geopolitical rivals. While many experts advocate for greater international cooperation on AI safety to address shared global risks, some view cooperation on AI with suspicion, arguing that it can pose unacceptable risks to national security. However, the extent to which cooperation on AI safety poses such risks, as well as provides benefits, depends on the specific area of cooperation. In this paper, we consider technical factors that impact the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, focusing on the degree to which such cooperation can advance dangerous capabilities, result in the sharing of sensitive information, or provide opportunities for harm. We begin by why nations historically cooperate on strategic technologies and analyse current US-China cooperation in AI as a case study. We further argue that existing frameworks for managing associated risks can be supplemented with consideration of key risks specific to cooperation on technical AI safety research. Through our analysis, we find that research into AI verification mechanisms and shared protocols may be suitable areas for such cooperation. Through this analysis we aim to help researchers and governments identify and mitigate the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, so that the benefits of cooperation can be fully realised.

The web is increasingly accessed by AI agents rather than humans. Every agent needs knowledge, especially in the life-sciences, where agentic pipelines are growing fast. Access to the literature is a crucial part of that need, and resources such as Europe PMC, with over 40M indexed records, are widely used to meet it. Yet these resources were not built for AI agents: they take keywords and complex syntax and return whole papers, so every agent must learn the syntax, issue several searches, and read full papers to find the evidence it needs. We introduce EMBL AI Librarian, a knowledge layer that upgrades the Europe PMC interface for AI agents: an agent asks in natural language and receives evidence that answers it. A single LLM orchestrates the whole knowledge retrieval process: it plans complementary subqueries executed by the live Europe PMC search engine, then reads the selected papers and locates the relevant evidence. We evaluate Librarian across four benchmarks: literature synthesis, claim verification, open-domain question answering, and downstream biology tasks such as protocol questions and sequence manipulation. On ScholarQABench, Librarian improves Citation F1 by more than 16 points over strong recently published baselines. Used as the retrieval layer of an existing claim-verification pipeline, it increases agreement with expert consensus; and on the open-form LitQA2 benchmark, a GPT-5.4 agent scores about 8 points higher when grounded in Librarian than with web search. Overall, our results show that equipping life-science agents with the Librarian knowledge layer improves performance across a range of tasks. We release our code publicly at https://github.com/petroni-lab/librarian

Verifiable delegation in digital identity systems remains unresolved across centralized, federated, and self-sovereign identity (SSI) environments, particularly where both human users and autonomous AI agents must exercise and transfer authority without exposing primary credentials or private keys. We introduce a unified framework that enables bounded, auditable, and least-privilege delegation across heterogeneous identity ecosystems. The framework includes four key elements: Delegation Grants (DGs), first-class authorization artefacts that encode revocable transfers of authority with enforced scope reduction; a Canonical Verification Context (CVC) that normalizes verification requests into a single structured representation independent of protocols or credential formats; a layered reference architecture that separates trust anchoring, credential and proof validation, policy evaluation, and protocol mediation via a Trust Gateway; and an explicit treatment of blockchain anchoring as an optional integrity layer rather than a structural dependency. Together, these elements advance interoperable delegation and auditability and provide a foundation for future standardization, implementation, and integration of autonomous agents into trusted digital identity infrastructures.

Multi-agent systems built on large language models (LLMs) require many coordination choices that are difficult to fix a priori: which skill protocol to invoke, which agent role should perform a subtask, which model to bind to each role, how roles should interact, when to use retrieval or verification, and when to omit a step entirely. These choices interact with task regime and operational constraints, so static pipelines and one-off model comparisons provide only a limited view of the design space. This paper introduces AgensFlow, an open-source framework that treats multi-agent coordination as an online policy-learning problem under partial observability. The framework makes coordination decisions observable and learnable from repeated trajectories, rather than treating skill, role, model, topology, and evaluation choices as fixed pipeline design. AgensFlow is evaluated on two corpora: distributed-systems incident tasks and security-advisory tasks. The evaluation shows three main results: learned routing reaches a higher-quality operating point than a fixed pipeline baseline on coordination-heavy classes; skip:X isolates topology compression as a meaningful part of the substrate; and warm-started policy graphs can reduce exploration cost while preserving plateau quality. Overall, the results support that learned, auditable routing can improve coordination-heavy multi-agent workflows over static wiring.

Multimodal agents for visual question answering increasingly operate as multi-step trajectories that interleave perception, retrieval, and reasoning, yet evaluation still largely reduces to final-answer accuracy. This aggregate signal cannot tell whether a correct answer was reached through grounded evidence, language priors, or accidental error cancellation. We propose to treat a multimodal agent trajectory as a provenance-constrained state machine: tool outputs are normalized into a Structured Evidence Ledger that serves as the trajectory state, downstream reasoning and decision claims may cite only active ledger entries, grounding is checked at the entity and numeric level, and repair is realized as typed state transitions that cannot introduce content without tool-produced provenance. We instantiate this design as LedgerMind (Provenance-Constrained Multimodal Agentic Reasoning with a Structured Evidence Ledger), augmented by a Three-Layer Grounding Protocol, an Adaptive Dual-Path Dispatcher that matches reasoning depth to question complexity, and an Event-Triggered Verification-and-Repair engine with a formal provenance non-amplification guarantee. We use LedgerMind to target four recurring failure patterns that final-answer accuracy tends to obscure: unsupported intermediate reasoning, citation-backed entity hallucination (Phantom Grounding), over-reasoning on simple queries, and repair-time amplification. Experiments across multiple multimodal reasoning benchmarks and backbone MLLMs show that LedgerMind improves both answer accuracy and trajectory-level faithfulness.

Ecological imbalance owing to rapid urbanization and deforestation has adversely affected the population of several wild animals. This loss of habitat has skewed the population of several non-human primate species like chimpanzees and macaques and has constrained them to co-exist in close proximity of human settlements, often leading to human-wildlife conflicts while competing for resources. For effective wildlife conservation and conflict management, regular monitoring of population and of conflicted regions is necessary. However, existing approaches like field visits for data collection and manual analysis by experts is resource intensive, tedious and time consuming, thus necessitating an automated, non-invasive, more efficient alternative like image based facial recognition. The challenge in individual identification arises due to unrelated factors like pose, lighting variations and occlusions due to the uncontrolled environments, that is further exacerbated by limited training data. Inspired by human perception, we propose to learn representations that are robust to such nuisance factors and capture the notion of similarity over the individual identity sub-manifolds. The proposed approach, Primate Face Identification (PFID), achieves this by training the network to distinguish between positive and negative pairs of images. The PFID loss augments the standard cross entropy loss with a pairwise loss to learn more discriminative and generalizable features, thus making it appropriate for other related identification tasks like open-set, closed set and verification. We report state-of-the-art accuracy on facial recognition of two primate species, rhesus macaques and chimpanzees under the four protocols of classification, verification, closed-set identification and open-set recognition.

Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, demonstrate remarkable capabilities in executing complex, long-horizon tasks. However, their tightly coupled instant-messaging interaction paradigm and high-privilege execution capabilities substantially expand the system attack surface. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security threat analysis of OpenClaw. To structure our analysis, we introduce a five-layer lifecycle-oriented security framework that captures key stages of agent operation, i.e., initialization, input, inference, decision, and execution, and systematically examine compound threats across the agent's operational lifecycle, including indirect prompt injection, skill supply chain contamination, memory poisoning, and intent drift. Through detailed case studies on OpenClaw, we demonstrate the prevalence and severity of these threats and analyze the limitations of existing defenses. Our findings reveal critical weaknesses in current point-based defense mechanisms when addressing cross-temporal and multi-stage systemic risks, highlighting the need for holistic security architectures for autonomous LLM agents. Within this framework, we further examine representative defense strategies at each lifecycle stage, including plugin vetting frameworks, context-aware instruction filtering, memory integrity validation protocols, intent verification mechanisms, and capability enforcement architectures.

Digital entities such as AI agents and humanoid robots increasingly operate alongside real humans, yet their identity infrastructure is based on credentials rather than embodied biometric identity. We introduce Biometric Identity Provisioning (BIP), a new problem and solution framework that addresses: given an enrollment gallery of real human identities, provision virtual identities that are non-colliding with every enrolled identity, maintain sufficient inter-class separability, and are realizable as high-fidelity face images. The key geometric insight is that real face identities occupy a low-dimensional subspace of the embedding hypersphere, leaving no residual subspace for virtual identities. Hence, virtual identities must instead be allocated as unclaimed gaps within the real face manifold itself. BIP is therefore a constrained packing problem: available gaps vastly exceed any foreseeable enrollment scale, and provisioned identities remain non-colliding even as new real identities are subsequently enrolled. Grounded in this geometry, our repulsion-based allocation is not bounded by any fixed provisioning count; we demonstrate 10M non-colliding virtual identity embeddings against a gallery of 360K real identities. Realizing these embeddings as face images requires a generator that operates outside the training distribution of real face images; we introduce GapGen, a gap-aware generator trained with a curriculum that progressively extends synthesis into non-colliding regions, validated at 1M photorealistic virtual face images. We further construct v-LFW, a virtual counterpart to LFW face dataset, with protocols for virtual face verification, cross-reality matching, real-vs-virtual detection, and unified recognition and detection.

The progress of large language models (LLMs) has fueled claims that model-generated summaries rival or even surpass human-written references, raising questions about whether summarization remains an open research problem. We re-examine this narrative through a multi-track evaluation covering five diverse datasets and five state-of-the-art LLMs, combining controlled human assessment, bias-mitigated LLM-as-Judge protocols, factuality verification against external knowledge, and corpus-level linguistic analysis. Our findings reveal a more nuanced landscape in which human reference summaries continue to demonstrate advantages in informativeness and faithfulness, whereas LLM outputs are preferred mainly for surface-level coherence and fluency. Factuality verification indicates that human references remain more reliable, particularly for claims involving reasoning or synthesis, and linguistic analysis uncovers a pattern of stylistic homogeneity across different models. These observations suggest that current LLMs have raised the floor of summarization quality, but the ceiling of their performance remains below human capabilities.

Personalized mobile agents that infer user preferences and calibrate proactive assistance hold great promise as everyday digital assistants, yet existing benchmarks fail to capture what this requires. Prior work evaluates preference recovery from static histories or intent prediction from fixed contexts. Neither tests whether an agent can elicit missing preferences through interaction, nor whether it can decide when to intervene, seek consent, or remain silent in a live GUI environment. We introduce KnowU-Bench, an online benchmark for personalized mobile agents built on a reproducible Android emulation environment, covering 42 general GUI tasks, 86 personalized tasks, and 64 proactive tasks. Unlike prior work that treats user preferences as static context, KnowU-Bench hides the user profile from the agent and exposes only behavioral logs, forcing genuine preference inference rather than context lookup. To support multi-turn preference elicitation, it instantiates an LLM-driven user simulator grounded in structured profiles, enabling realistic clarification dialogues and proactive consent handling. Beyond personalization, KnowU-Bench provides comprehensive evaluation of the complete proactive decision chain, including grounded GUI execution, consent negotiation, and post-rejection restraint, evaluated through a hybrid protocol combining rule-based verification with LLM-as-a-Judge scoring. Our experiments reveal a striking degradation: agents that excel at explicit task execution fall below 50% under vague instructions requiring user preference inference or intervention calibration, even for frontier models like Claude Sonnet 4.6. The core bottlenecks are not GUI navigation but preference acquisition and intervention calibration, exposing a fundamental gap between competent interface operation and trustworthy personal assistance.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

State machine replication (SMR) and Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus guarantee agreement despite a bounded number of arbitrary, colluding faulty participants. However, these guarantees rely on participants outside this set correctly executing the protocol's transition semantics. Agentic validators expose a weaker boundary: an authenticated, responsive, non-equivocating, and protocol-compliant reasoning participant may still endorse a semantically invalid transition due to reasoning errors. We call this failure mode an epistemic fault, and the collective phenomenon the Honest Quorum Problem (where "honest" means protocol-compliant, not semantically correct). Such a quorum can satisfy ordinary checks while forming a certificate for an invalid transition. Thus, agreement alone does not guarantee semantic validity or execution safety. Furthermore, because agentic validators often share model weights, training distributions, prompts, or toolchains, they are highly susceptible to correlated epistemic faults. We define Epistemic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (EBFT), a fault-tolerance model for agentic infrastructure and post-deterministic distributed systems. EBFT augments the conventional Byzantine fault bound with two separate, confidence-indexed quantities: e_δ bounds coherent invalid endorsements outside the Byzantine set, and u_ε bounds unusable validator support that degrades liveness. These quantities characterize semantic safety risk and liveness degradation independently. We derive quorum-threshold conditions for semantic validity, consensus agreement, liveness, and feasible threshold selection, and outline a calibration methodology for estimating these budgets. We show that adding nominally distinct agents improves fault tolerance only when it measurably reduces the upper-tail concentration of invalid endorsements or unusable support.

QDNA-ID is a trust-chain framework that links physical quantum behavior to digitally verified records. The system first executes standard quantum circuits with random shot patterns across different devices to generate entropy profiles and measurement data that reveal device-specific behavior. A Bell or CHSH test is then used to confirm that correlations originate from genuine non classical processes rather than classical simulation. The verified outcomes are converted into statistical fingerprints using entropy, divergence, and bias features to characterize each device. These features and metadata for device, session, and random seed parameters are digitally signed and time stamped to ensure integrity and traceability. Authenticated artifacts are stored in a hierarchical index for reproducible retrieval and long term auditing. A visualization and analytics interface monitors drift, policy enforcement, and device behavior logs. A machine learning engine tracks entropy drift, detects anomalies, and classifies devices based on evolving patterns. An external verification API supports independent recomputation of hashes, signatures, and CHSH evidence. QDNA-ID operates as a continuous feedback loop that maintains a persistent chain of trust for quantum computing environments.

As autonomous AI agents increasingly transact across organizational boundaries, a fundamental trust challenge emerges: how can an agent assess whether an unknown counterpart is trustworthy? The ERC-8004 protocol addresses this challenge with the first permissionless trust layer for AI agent economies, built around three on-chain registries for Identity, Reputation, and Validation. Despite its rapid adoption, the protocol has not been studied empirically, leaving it unclear whether the information it records provides a trustworthy basis for decision-making. To address this gap, we present the first empirical study of ERC-8004 across three chains: Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain (BSC), and Base, covering the period from protocol deployment through May 13, 2026. We crawl on-chain Identity and Reputation events, off-chain files, and x402 payment transactions. On the identity side, we find that most registrations are placeholders rather than active agents, with only a small fraction (3%, 4%, and 15% across Ethereum, BSC, and Base) exposing a valid ERC-8004 registration file with at least one live service endpoint. On the reputation side, we show that the Registry, as currently deployed, cannot function as a trust signal: values are not commensurable, feedback records are rarely grounded in verifiable interactions, and reputation can be manipulated at minimal cost. Consistent with these design weaknesses, we find that a substantial fraction of reviewers (73.5%, 59.2%, and 90.6% across Ethereum, BSC, and Base) exhibit coordinated Sybil behavior. After removing Sybil-flagged feedback, 15.8%, 77.9%, and 86.8% of rated agents, respectively, are left with no valid feedback. We then turn these findings into concrete recommendations for future revisions of ERC-8004. Our study yields actionable protocol-design implications and establishes an empirical baseline for research on AI agent markets.

Foundation models are moving from response generation into operational roles. They plan across steps, call tools, request human input, coordinate with other agents, and increasingly carry responsibility for work that affects customers, claims, code, contracts, and clinical decisions. Production deployments are no longer one human supervising one model. They are multi-human, multi-agent collaborations that cross teams, time zones, and trust boundaries. The technical surface for this collaboration remains weakly specified. When an agent drafts a response and a human edits it before it ships, the moment of human judgement is the most valuable signal in the system. In current practice it is recorded, if at all, in application code, chat threads, ticket comments, and tribal memory. Two protocol standards address adjacent concerns: MCP standardises agent access to tools and data, and A2A standardises agent-to-agent interoperability. Neither defines the shared workspace in which humans and agents perform accountable work together. This paper presents CHAP, the Collaborative Human-Agent Protocol. Under CHAP, the override that used to vanish into a chat thread becomes a structured event carrying a diff, a rationale, and a content hash. The handoff between shifts becomes a portable envelope rather than a pinned message. The human approval of an agent's draft becomes a non-repudiable signed decision that can be replayed years later. The protocol achieves this through a small Core (workspaces, participants, tasks, artefacts, and an append-only evidence log) together with composable profiles that add review, modes, routing, deliberation, handoff, identity, signatures, and transparency-backed audit as deployments require them. Specification, reference implementation, conformance suite, and worked examples are available at: https://github.com/BrightbeamAI/chap

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines a schema bound execution model for agent-tool interaction, enabling modular computer vision workflows without retraining. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol level, deployment scale audit of MCP in vision systems, identifying systemic weaknesses in schema semantics, interoperability, and runtime coordination. We analyze 91 publicly registered vision centric MCP servers, annotated along nine dimensions of compositional fidelity, and develop an executable benchmark with validators to detect and categorize protocol violations. The audit reveals high prevalence of schema format divergence, missing runtime schema validation, undeclared coordinate conventions, and reliance on untracked bridging scripts. Validator based testing quantifies these failures, with schema format checks flagging misalignments in 78.0 percent of systems, coordinate convention checks detecting spatial reference errors in 24.6 percent, and memory scope checks issuing an average of 33.8 warnings per 100 executions. Security probes show that dynamic and multi agent workflows exhibit elevated risks of privilege escalation and untyped tool connections. The proposed benchmark and validator suite, implemented in a controlled testbed and to be released on GitHub, establishes a reproducible framework for measuring and improving the reliability and security of compositional vision workflows.

Digital signatures prove key possession, not authorship. An author who generates text with AI, constructs intermediate document states post-hoc, and signs each hash produces a signature chain indistinguishable from genuine composition. We address this gap between cryptographic integrity and process provenance. We introduce proof-of-process, a primitive category for evidence that a physical process, not merely a signing key, produced a digital artifact. Our construction, the jitter seal, injects imperceptible microsecond delays derived via HMAC from a session secret, keystroke ordinal, and cumulative document hash. Valid evidence requires that real keystrokes produced the document through those intermediate states. We propose the Adversarial Collapse Principle as an evaluation criterion: evidence systems should be judged by whether disputing them requires a conjunction of specific, testable allegations against components with independent trust assumptions. We present Witnessd, an architecture combining jitter seals with Verifiable Delay Functions, external timestamp anchors, dual-source keystroke validation, and optional hardware attestation. Each layer forces allegations at different capability levels; disputing authentic evidence requires coordinated claims across independent trust boundaries. The system does not prevent forgery: a kernel-level adversary can defeat it, and typing AI-generated content produces valid evidence. The contribution is converting vague doubt into falsifiable allegations. We evaluate across 31,000 verification trials with deterministic rejection of invalid proofs.

We propose a new comprehensive benchmark to revolutionize the current deepfake detection field to the next generation. Predominantly, existing works identify top-notch detection algorithms and models by adhering to the common practice: training detectors on one specific dataset (e.g., FF++) and testing them on other prevalent deepfake datasets. This protocol is often regarded as a "golden compass" for navigating SoTA detectors. But can these stand-out "winners" be truly applied to tackle the myriad of realistic and diverse deepfakes lurking in the real world? If not, what underlying factors contribute to this gap? In this work, we found the dataset (both train and test) can be the "primary culprit" due to: (1) forgery diversity: Deepfake techniques are commonly referred to as both face forgery and entire image synthesis. Most existing datasets only contain partial types of them, with limited forgery methods implemented; (2) forgery realism: The dominated training dataset, FF++, contains out-of-date forgery techniques from the past four years. "Honing skills" on these forgeries makes it difficult to guarantee effective detection generalization toward nowadays' SoTA deepfakes; (3) evaluation protocol: Most detection works perform evaluations on one type, which hinders the development of universal deepfake detectors. To address this dilemma, we construct a highly diverse deepfake detection dataset called DF40, which comprises 40 distinct deepfake techniques. We then conduct comprehensive evaluations using 4 standard evaluation protocols and 8 representative detection methods, resulting in over 2,000 evaluations. Through these evaluations, we provide an extensive analysis from various perspectives, leading to 7 new insightful findings. We also open up 4 valuable yet previously underexplored research questions to inspire future works. Our project page is https://github.com/YZY-stack/DF40.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

Large language models are often adapted through parameter efficient fine tuning, but current release practices provide weak assurances about what data were used and how updates were computed. We present Verifiable Fine Tuning, a protocol and system that produces succinct zero knowledge proofs that a released model was obtained from a public initialization under a declared training program and an auditable dataset commitment. The approach combines five elements. First, commitments that bind data sources, preprocessing, licenses, and per epoch quota counters to a manifest. Second, a verifiable sampler that supports public replayable and private index hiding batch selection. Third, update circuits restricted to parameter efficient fine tuning that enforce AdamW style optimizer semantics and proof friendly approximations with explicit error budgets. Fourth, recursive aggregation that folds per step proofs into per epoch and end to end certificates with millisecond verification. Fifth, provenance binding and optional trusted execution property cards that attest code identity and constants. On English and bilingual instruction mixtures, the method maintains utility within tight budgets while achieving practical proof performance. Policy quotas are enforced with zero violations, and private sampling windows show no measurable index leakage. Federated experiments demonstrate that the system composes with probabilistic audits and bandwidth constraints. These results indicate that end to end verifiable fine tuning is feasible today for real parameter efficient pipelines, closing a critical trust gap for regulated and decentralized deployments.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

Reality may establish that an outcome occurred without identifying which evolving procedure produced it or why. This distinction matters in production ML systems whose code, configuration, and artifacts change while external feedback accumulates. We examine it in a human-directed, agent-engineered quantitative trading system, using oracle to mean an external source of realized outcomes rather than a complete correctness specification. Across one year, the account gained and outperformed a broad market index, while annual alpha was not statistically distinguishable from zero under the main retrospective specification. Retrospectively selected subperiods include adverse relative performance and conditional candidate-level weakness under declared approximate references. Engineering records document changes during the episode, and complete recommendation-to-runtime binding is unavailable. The archive does not establish a common frozen instance or a unique cause. The case motivates an outcome--diagnosis gap: outcome evidence, evaluated-object identity, and causal explanation support distinct claims. We distinguish frozen instances, pre-specified adaptive procedures, and ad-hoc development; organize archive-relative claim identifiability and an evidence hierarchy; and propose a prospective production-binding protocol. An illustrative compatible-history example shows how factual binding can resolve a recommendation's referent without supplying its counterfactual effect. The protocol is proposed rather than prospectively validated. External feedback constrains outcome claims, while provenance and additional identification structure determine the resolution of diagnosis.

AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets. Existing evaluation protocols assess and optimize for predefined goals such as capture-the-flag, remote code execution, exploit reproduction, or trajectory similarity, in simplified or narrow settings. These tools are valuable for measuring bounded capabilities, yet they do not adequately capture the complexity, open-ended exploration, and strategic decision-making required in realistic pentesting. In this paper, we present a practical evaluation protocol that shifts assessment from task completion to validated vulnerability discovery, allowing evaluation in sufficiently complex targets spanning multiple attack surfaces and vulnerability classes. The protocol combines structured ground-truth with LLM-based semantic matching to identify vulnerabilities, bipartite resolution to score findings under realistic ambiguity, continuous ground-truth maintenance, repeated and cumulative evaluation of stochastic agents, efficiency metrics, and reduced-suite selection for sustainable experimentation. This protocol extends the state of the art by enabling a more realistic, operationally informative comparison of AI pentesting agents. To enable reproducibility, we also release expert-annotated ground truth and code for the proposed evaluation protocol: https://github.com/ethiack/ethibench.

Recent machine learning papers often report 1-2 percentage point improvements from a single run on a benchmark. These gains are highly sensitive to random seeds, data ordering, and implementation details, yet are rarely accompanied by uncertainty estimates or significance tests. It is therefore unclear when a reported +1-2% reflects a real algorithmic advance versus noise. We revisit this problem under realistic compute budgets, where only a few runs are affordable. We propose a simple, PC-friendly evaluation protocol based on paired multi-seed runs, bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap confidence intervals, and a sign-flip permutation test on per-seed deltas. The protocol is intentionally conservative and is meant as a guardrail against over-claiming. We instantiate it on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10N, and AG News using synthetic no-improvement, small-gain, and medium-gain scenarios. Single runs and unpaired t-tests often suggest significant gains for 0.6-2.0 point improvements, especially on text. With only three seeds, our paired protocol never declares significance in these settings. We argue that such conservative evaluation is a safer default for small gains under tight budgets.

As LLM agents undertake increasingly complex, long-horizon tasks, verifying their outputs becomes increasingly challenging. We study how verification capability can be strengthened with a fixed base model, without access to reference answers or grading rubrics at test time. Repeated sampling yields multiple rollouts that can contain complementary correct claims, but we need a reliable verification mechanism to determine which claims to trust. We first find that disagreement often exposes correct alternatives, while consensus can conceal errors. These observations motivate VeriHarness, which turns the underlying LLM a generator uses into an agentic verifier by giving it a workspace, evidence tools, and reusable verification skills. A disagreement resolver checks competing claims against environmental evidence, while a consensus challenger tests shared claims and searches for omitted requirements. Their findings guide the selection and revision of the final artifact. Across five long-horizon workspace benchmarks and two frontier models, VeriHarness achieves the highest selection scores among the evaluated baselines. Evidence-backed revision further improves average performance, bringing gains over a single rollout to 6.2 points with Gemini 3.5 Flash and 6.4 points with Claude Opus 4.8. We further show that verification skills can self-improve from failure feedback, demonstrating VeriHarness as a novel and critical approach for scaling long-horizon agentic verification. We release the full pool of approximately 26,000 rollouts across all five benchmarks and both models, produced at a cost of over $100,000, to support future research on agentic verification.

An AI control protocol is a plan for usefully deploying AI systems that aims to prevent an AI from intentionally causing some unacceptable outcome. This paper investigates how well AI systems can generate and act on their own strategies for subverting control protocols whilst operating statelessly (without shared memory between contexts). To do this, an AI system may need to reliably generate optimal plans in each context, take actions with well-calibrated probabilities, and coordinate plans with other instances of itself without communicating. We develop Subversion Strategy Eval, a suite of eight environments, covering a range of protocols and strategic capabilities, and six sets of affordances that help isolate individual capabilities. We implement the evaluation in Inspect-AI and release it open-source. We evaluate Claude 3.5 models, including helpful-only versions, as well as OpenAI reasoning models. None of the models demonstrate substantial capability in strategizing to subvert control protocols statelessly. However, providing models with additional affordances, such as the ability to share a plan between contexts, can substantially improve performance. We hope our evaluations can act as a leading indicator for when models are capable of subverting control protocols and also relax the worst-case assumption of perfect strategic ability in AI control evaluations.

Blockchain technology, which was introduced for supporting cryptocurrencies, today provides a decentralized infrastructure for general information storage and execution of algorithms, thus enabling the conversion of many applications and services from a centralized and intermediated model to a decentralized and disintermediated one. In this paper we focus on biometric authentication, which is classically performed using centralized systems, and could hence benefit from decentralization. For such a purpose, however, an inherent contradiction between biometric applications and blockchain technology must be overcome, as the former require keeping biometric features private, while blockchain is a public infrastructure. We propose a blockchain-based biometric authentication protocol that enables decentralization and resilience while protecting the privacy, personal data, and, in particular, biometric features of users. The protocol we propose leverages fuzzy commitment schemes to allow biometric authentication to be performed without disclosing biometric data. We also analyze the security of the protocol we propose by considering some relevant attacks.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) for structuring clinical data is critically hindered by their tendency to hallucinate facts and their inability to follow domain-specific rules. To address this, we introduce MedPAO, a novel agentic framework that ensures accuracy and verifiable reasoning by grounding its operation in established clinical protocols such as the ABCDEF protocol for CXR analysis. MedPAO decomposes the report structuring task into a transparent process managed by a Plan-Act-Observe (PAO) loop and specialized tools. This protocol-driven method provides a verifiable alternative to opaque, monolithic models. The efficacy of our approach is demonstrated through rigorous evaluation: MedPAO achieves an F1-score of 0.96 on the critical sub-task of concept categorization. Notably, expert radiologists and clinicians rated the final structured outputs with an average score of 4.52 out of 5, indicating a level of reliability that surpasses baseline approaches relying solely on LLM-based foundation models. The code is available at: https://github.com/MiRL-IITM/medpao-agent

Visual fluency in generated video does not imply physical reliability, and a scalar quality score alone is incapable of indicating the obligation a clip violates or the moment it fails. We present VeriPhy, an auditable physical-verification system in which a text-only planner compiles the prompt into typed physical obligations and a statically validated execution plan before any frame is observed. During execution, observations gate and scope only declared calls to frozen low-level experts (e.g., segmentation and tracking, counting, eleven typed physical measurements over the resulting tracks, depth, OCR, and audio-event detection). Each action returns a provenance-carrying evidence record whose payload, when usable, is either a typed measurement or an explicitly tagged learned state. Typed resolvers and fixed composition map usable records to a three-valued state (supported, contradicted, or unknown, surfaced as plausible, implausible, or abstain) with full provenance, so that every verdict is traceable to the evidence that produced it. We anchor evaluation in a 1,500-clip corpus of human-annotated flaw records that localize real generation failures in prompt reference, space, and time. On a 149-clip core carrying 304 such records, VeriPhy accounts for 228, against 164 for a published question-decomposition evaluator given the same clips and the same claims. Recall alone does not separate it from prompting the same backbone monolithically, which reaches 222; what separates them is that each decision retains its evidence record and provenance, making the traces auditable one verdict at a time and usable as the interface through which a critic verdict could be written back into generation.

EigenAI is a verifiable AI platform built on top of the EigenLayer restaking ecosystem. At a high level, it combines a deterministic large-language model (LLM) inference engine with a cryptoeconomically secured optimistic re-execution protocol so that every inference result can be publicly audited, reproduced, and, if necessary, economically enforced. An untrusted operator runs inference on a fixed GPU architecture, signs and encrypts the request and response, and publishes the encrypted log to EigenDA. During a challenge window, any watcher may request re-execution through EigenVerify; the result is then deterministically recomputed inside a trusted execution environment (TEE) with a threshold-released decryption key, allowing a public challenge with private data. Because inference itself is bit-exact, verification reduces to a byte-equality check, and a single honest replica suffices to detect fraud. We show how this architecture yields sovereign agents -- prediction-market judges, trading bots, and scientific assistants -- that enjoy state-of-the-art performance while inheriting security from Ethereum's validator base.

Terminal agents rely on self-verification to assess and correct their solutions as they solve tasks through interaction with command-line environments. Yet how trustworthy such self-verification is remains poorly understood. To investigate this question systematically, we introduce a diagnostic framework that identifies the first complete solution in each trajectory, determines whether it is objectively correct, and uses this ground truth to quantify the agent's subsequent verification and recovery behavior. Applying it to ten terminal agents on TerminalBench2.1, we find that verification is nearly universal after a complete candidate is formed, yet only 61.43\% of incorrect candidates are detected and only 49.36\% of detected errors are successfully repaired. These results show that the main weakness in self-verification lies not in initiating verification, but in detecting and repairing errors. Motivated by these findings, we propose Student-Conditioned Verification Distillation (SCVD), which lets the student first produce a candidate solution and distills a stronger teacher's subsequent verification and recovery from the same interaction context. Across three Qwen3.5 backbones, SCVD improves Pass@1 on TerminalBench2.1 by 9.74--16.85 percentage points over the corresponding base models and by 4.49--8.61 points over the standard full-trajectory distillation, while avoiding the pronounced out-of-distribution degradation of full-trajectory distillation on SWE-bench Verified.

Digital identity is unsolved: after many years of research there is still no trusted communication over the Internet. To provide identity within the context of mutual distrust, this paper presents a blockchain-based digital identity solution. Without depending upon a single trusted third party, the proposed solution achieves passport-level legally valid identity. This solution for making identities Self-Sovereign, builds on a generic provable claim model for which attestations of truth from third parties need to be collected. The claim model is then shown to be both blockchain structure and proof method agnostic. Four different implementations in support of these two claim model properties are shown to offer sub-second performance for claim creation and claim verification. Through the properties of Self-Sovereign Identity, legally valid status and acceptable performance, our solution is considered to be fit for adoption by the general public.

Agent benchmarks increasingly evaluate repository editing, web research, terminal use, and long-horizon interaction. Their scores support capability claims only when the evaluation protocol keeps the intended capability necessary for success. Recent reward-hacking benchmarks and system reports show that agents can instead recover public solutions, read evaluation artifacts, infer generator structure, manipulate feedback, or benefit from invalid scoring paths; existing responses do not provide a common procedure for attributing these shortcuts and quantifying their effect across benchmarks. We formulate protocol validity and introduce HackDetect, a post-hoc audit that identifies an exposure, determines how the agent used it, and assesses whether the resulting score is misleading. We quantify score inflation with the Mislead gap, defined as the exploit score minus the intended score. We audit 2,385 traces across 15 agent benchmarks and find evidence of exposures and reward hacking in 67.0% of Frontier Science traces and 66.7% of AutoLab tasks. Across paired comparisons, we measure score inflation of 0.45-1.00, showing that benchmark reports should provide evidence that scores reflect the intended capability.

Biological protocols are fundamental to reproducible and safe life science research. While LLMs excel on general tasks, their systematic evaluation on these highly specialized, accuracy-critical, and inherently procedural texts remains limited. In this work, we present BioProBench, the first large-scale, integrated multi-task benchmark for biological protocol understanding and reasoning. While limited benchmarks have touched upon specific aspects like protocol QA, BioProBench provides a comprehensive suite of five core tasks: Protocol Question Answering, Step Ordering, Error Correction, Protocol Generation, and Protocol Reasoning, enabling a holistic evaluation of LLMs on procedural biological texts. Built upon 27K original protocols, it yields nearly 556K high-quality structured instances. We evaluate 12 mainstream open/closed-source LLMs on BioProBench. Experimental results reveal that while top models preform well on surface understanding tasks, struggle significantly with deep reasoning and structured generation tasks like ordering and generation. Furthermore, model comparisons reveal diverse performance: certain open-source models approach closed-source levels on some tasks, yet bio-specific small models lag behind general LLMs, indicating limitations on complex procedural content. Overall, our findings underscore that procedural reasoning within biological protocols represents a significant challenge for current LLMs. BioProBench serves as a standardized framework to diagnose these specific limitations and guide the development of AI systems better equipped for safely automating complex scientific procedures. The code and data are available at: https://github.com/YuyangSunshine/bioprotocolbench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/GreatCaptainNemo/BioProBench.

Qiskit is an open-source quantum computing framework that allows users to design, simulate, and run quantum circuits on real quantum hardware. We explore post-training techniques for LLMs to assist in writing Qiskit code. We introduce quantum verification as an effective method for ensuring code quality and executability on quantum hardware. To support this, we developed a synthetic data pipeline that generates quantum problem-unit test pairs and used it to create preference data for aligning LLMs with DPO. Additionally, we trained models using GRPO, leveraging quantum-verifiable rewards provided by the quantum hardware. Our best-performing model, combining DPO and GRPO, surpasses the strongest open-source baselines on the challenging Qiskit-HumanEval-hard benchmark.

Answer verification methods are widely employed in language model training pipelines spanning data curation, evaluation, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). While prior work focus on developing unified verifiers applicable across multiple reasoning scenarios, significant challenges remain in computation-oriented scientific domains, such as algebraic equivalence checking and physical constant substitution. In this paper, we introduce \model, a tool-augmented verifier that leverages external executors to perform precise computations and symbolic simplifications. \model enables robust verification that goes beyond simple semantic matching. We propose a novel two-stage pipeline, which begin with cold-start fine-tuning and followed by multi-turn reinforcement learning with tool integration. Extensive experiments conducted on STEM subjects, general QA, and long-form reasoning tasks demonstrates strong generalization of \model. The results shows that the \model achieves state-of-the-art performance on VerifyBench-Hard and SCI-Bench. And we also employ our \model in RLVR as a reward model, the results show that it consistently outperforms both rubric-based and model-based verifiers on AIME'24 and AIME'25, demonstrating strong potential to enhance reasoning capabilities of LLM. Our model is released at https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B{https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B}.

Recent text-to-video (T2V) technology advancements, as demonstrated by models such as Gen2, Pika, and Sora, have significantly broadened its applicability and popularity. Despite these strides, evaluating these models poses substantial challenges. Primarily, due to the limitations inherent in automatic metrics, manual evaluation is often considered a superior method for assessing T2V generation. However, existing manual evaluation protocols face reproducibility, reliability, and practicality issues. To address these challenges, this paper introduces the Text-to-Video Human Evaluation (T2VHE) protocol, a comprehensive and standardized protocol for T2V models. The T2VHE protocol includes well-defined metrics, thorough annotator training, and an effective dynamic evaluation module. Experimental results demonstrate that this protocol not only ensures high-quality annotations but can also reduce evaluation costs by nearly 50%. We will open-source the entire setup of the T2VHE protocol, including the complete protocol workflow, the dynamic evaluation component details, and the annotation interface code. This will help communities establish more sophisticated human assessment protocols.

An AI scientist should not grade its own homework. Yet in the systems we examined, the agent that reviews the work usually comes from the same model family as the agent that produced it, or at least from the same vendor. Model evaluators are known to favour their own generations. Whether models trained alike also share blind spots is a conjecture, not a settled finding, but if they do, the reviewer inherits the author's. The record of what was flagged and what was waved through often sits in platform logs that nobody outside can replay. We present CrossAudit, a protocol for supervising autonomous research pipelines. It rests on three commitments. Each increment of work is audited by an agent from a different vendor against a rulebook a human wrote and versioned. Reports, verdicts, disputes and rulings are git commits, so the supervision history can be re-read and cited; raw model exchanges are not yet part of that record. Scripted checks run before any model does. Advisory judgement never gates the pipeline: a model blocks only by citing a rule, and no model may waive a deterministic failure. Blockers that survive a bounded number of revision rounds go to a person. We state the protocol as eight invariants. We describe a reference implementation built from GitHub Actions and a few hundred lines of Python, and report a live deployment of a closely related variant in a computational-chemistry pipeline. We also ran a seeded-defect trial (30 increments, 43 seeded defects, one run per configuration). A cross-vendor audit of our own repository then voided its blinding. We adopt that audit's findings and report the corrected results. The trial shows that two vendors read the same rulebook differently. It does not show that either is better. The strongest evidence here is the committed, uncontrolled record of cross-vendor audits of this paper itself.

Automated attack discovery techniques, such as attacker synthesis or model-based fuzzing, provide powerful ways to ensure network protocols operate correctly and securely. Such techniques, in general, require a formal representation of the protocol, often in the form of a finite state machine (FSM). Unfortunately, many protocols are only described in English prose, and implementing even a simple network protocol as an FSM is time-consuming and prone to subtle logical errors. Automatically extracting protocol FSMs from documentation can significantly contribute to increased use of these techniques and result in more robust and secure protocol implementations. In this work we focus on attacker synthesis as a representative technique for protocol security, and on RFCs as a representative format for protocol prose description. Unlike other works that rely on rule-based approaches or use off-the-shelf NLP tools directly, we suggest a data-driven approach for extracting FSMs from RFC documents. Specifically, we use a hybrid approach consisting of three key steps: (1) large-scale word-representation learning for technical language, (2) focused zero-shot learning for mapping protocol text to a protocol-independent information language, and (3) rule-based mapping from protocol-independent information to a specific protocol FSM. We show the generalizability of our FSM extraction by using the RFCs for six different protocols: BGPv4, DCCP, LTP, PPTP, SCTP and TCP. We demonstrate how automated extraction of an FSM from an RFC can be applied to the synthesis of attacks, with TCP and DCCP as case-studies. Our approach shows that it is possible to automate attacker synthesis against protocols by using textual specifications such as RFCs.

The performance of autonomous Web GUI agents heavily relies on the quality and quantity of their training data. However, a fundamental bottleneck persists: collecting interaction trajectories from real-world websites is expensive and difficult to verify. The underlying state transitions are hidden, leading to reliance on inconsistent and costly external verifiers to evaluate step-level correctness. To address this, we propose AutoWebWorld, a novel framework for synthesizing controllable and verifiable web environments by modeling them as Finite State Machines (FSMs) and use coding agents to translate FSMs into interactive websites. Unlike real websites, where state transitions are implicit, AutoWebWorld explicitly defines all states, actions, and transition rules. This enables programmatic verification: action correctness is checked against predefined rules, and task success is confirmed by reaching a goal state in the FSM graph. AutoWebWorld enables a fully automated search-and-verify pipeline, generating over 11,663 verified trajectories from 29 diverse web environments at only $0.04 per trajectory. Training on this synthetic data significantly boosts real-world performance. Our 7B Web GUI agent outperforms all baselines within 15 steps on WebVoyager. Furthermore, we observe a clear scaling law: as the synthetic data volume increases, performance on WebVoyager and Online-Mind2Web consistently improves.

LeWorldModel trains a latent world model with a prediction loss and a single anti-collapse regulariser, and reports approximately 87% of goals reached on TwoRoom, its simplest diagnostic environment. We reproduce that result by independent reimplementation on roughly $25 of rented compute, with all evaluation on one laptop CPU. We reach 94.0% at the repository's evaluation goal offset, against 84.0% for the authors' own released checkpoint measured under our protocol on identical episodes, and we reproduce the reported representation result directly (position probe Pearson r = 0.9988 against a reported 0.996). Reaching that point required four conventions that determine the outcome and appear in no released configuration file: dense action gathering across a frameskip block, a programmatically-set action-encoder width, ImageNet pixel normalisation, and action z-scoring. A reproducer following the released configurations alone obtains a model whose predictor cannot converge. The evaluation protocol is itself contested by the released material. The paper's appendix and the repository's configuration specify different goal offsets and step budgets; on the authors' own weights these yield 14.0% and 84.0%, and only the configuration's values reproduce the reported figure. On fifty identical episodes, changing nothing but how the goal is constructed moves that checkpoint from 84.0% to 8.0%. Two findings generalise. One-step prediction accuracy does not predict long-horizon planning success: across three checkpoints spanning a sevenfold range in prediction error, including the authors' own, it orders short-horizon success monotonically and fails to order long-horizon success at all. And a batch normalisation layer inflated our reported validation loss by up to a factor of 300, concealing a training loss that was flat throughout.

Process attestation verifies human authorship by collecting behavioral biometric evidence, including keystroke dynamics, typing patterns, and editing behavior, during the creative process. However, the very data needed to prove authenticity can reveal intimate details about an author's cognitive state, health conditions, and identity, constituting sensitive biometric data under GDPR Article 9. We resolve this privacy-attestation paradox using zero-knowledge proofs. We present ZK-PoP, a construction that allows a verifier to confirm that (a) sequential work function chains were computed correctly, (b) behavioral feature vectors fall within human population distributions, and (c) content evolution is consistent with incremental human editing, all without learning the underlying behavioral data, exact timing, or intermediate content. Our construction uses Groth16 proofs over arithmetic circuits with Pedersen commitments and Bulletproof range proofs. We prove that ZK-PoP is computationally zero-knowledge, computationally sound, and achieves unlinkability across sessions. Evaluation shows proof generation in under 30 seconds for a 1-hour writing session, with 192-byte proofs verifiable in 8.2 ms, while incurring less than 5% accuracy loss in simulation at practical privacy levels (epsilon >= 1.0) compared to non-private baselines.

This paper presents a quantitative program verification infrastructure for discrete probabilistic programs. Our infrastructure can be viewed as the probabilistic analogue of Boogie: its central components are an intermediate verification language (IVL) together with a real-valued logic. Our IVL provides a programming-language-style for expressing verification conditions whose validity implies the correctness of a program under investigation. As our focus is on verifying quantitative properties such as bounds on expected outcomes, expected run-times, or termination probabilities, off-the-shelf IVLs based on Boolean first-order logic do not suffice. Instead, a paradigm shift from the standard Boolean to a real-valued domain is required. Our IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Verification conditions are generated by a weakest-precondition-style semantics, based on our real-valued logic. We show that our verification infrastructure supports natural encodings of numerous verification techniques from the literature. With our SMT-based implementation, we automatically verify a variety of benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this establishes the first deductive verification infrastructure for expectation-based reasoning about probabilistic programs.

Factual hallucination remains a central challenge for large language models (LLMs). Existing mitigation approaches primarily rely on either external post-hoc verification or mapping uncertainty directly to abstention during fine-tuning, often resulting in overly conservative behavior. We propose VeriFY, a training-time framework that teaches LLMs to reason about factual uncertainty through consistency-based self-verification. VeriFY augments training with structured verification traces that guide the model to produce an initial answer, generate and answer a probing verification query, issue a consistency judgment, and then decide whether to answer or abstain. To address the risk of reinforcing hallucinated content when training on augmented traces, we introduce a stage-level loss masking approach that excludes hallucinated answer stages from the training objective while preserving supervision over verification behavior. Across multiple model families and scales, VeriFY reduces factual hallucination rates by 9.7 to 53.3 percent, with only modest reductions in recall (0.4 to 5.7 percent), and generalizes across datasets when trained on a single source. The source code, training data, and trained model checkpoints will be released upon acceptance.

Diagnosing 802.11 packet captures requires expert protocol knowledge, is slow, inconsistent across engineers, and unscalable. LLM-based approaches sound plausible but fabricate protocol events absent from captures (especially truncated traces), produce uncalibrated confidence scores, and suffer evaluation bias when golden references are co-produced by the model under test. We introduce PROBE (Protocol Reasoning Over evidence-Based Ensembles), a multi-stage pipeline addressing all three failures. It integrates (i) deterministic PCAP-to-text normalization with frame-level verifiability, (ii) multi-run, multi-candidate ensembles with optional cross-model second opinion and progressive obfuscation, (iii) a verdict-aware evidence framework treating absence of failure evidence as contributing evidence, and (iv) a fully deterministic composite reliability score from evidence validity, run-to-run stability, and cross-model agreement without LLM self-assessment. On 87 enterprise Wi-Fi captures (104 capture-reviewer pairs), single-pass LLM analysis raises weighted evidence F1 from 0.871 (expert baseline) to 0.912 but misses critical frames in 35% of cases. Naive ensemble voting drops below baseline (0.842) as majority voting amplifies conservative verdicts: 50% of confirmed failures are misclassified as 'no issue' or 'insufficient evidence.' Adding evidence-grounded reconciliation achieves 0.957 F1, a 96% auto-accept rate, and a worst-case floor above 0.70. LLM self-reported confidence clusters at 0.95 regardless of difficulty (71% report exactly 0.95), confirming it is uninformative. We also introduce a model-agnostic evaluation framework using per-field assertion matching, eliminating circular bias from model-co-produced golden references.

The risks of frontier AI may require international cooperation, which in turn may require verification: checking that all parties follow agreed-on rules. For instance, states might need to verify that powerful AI models are widely deployed only after their risks to international security have been evaluated and deemed manageable. However, research on AI verification could benefit from greater clarity and detail. To address this, this report provides an in-depth overview of AI verification, intended for both policy professionals and technical researchers. We present novel conceptual frameworks, detailed implementation options, and key R&D challenges. These draw on existing literature, expert interviews, and original analysis, all within the scope of confidentially overseeing AI development and deployment that uses thousands of high-end AI chips. We find that states could eventually verify compliance by using six largely independent verification approaches with substantial redundancy: (1) built-in security features in AI chips; (2-3) separate monitoring devices attached to AI chips; and (4-6) personnel-based mechanisms, such as whistleblower programs. While promising, these approaches require guardrails to protect against abuse and power concentration, and many of these technologies have yet to be built or stress-tested. To enable states to confidently verify compliance with rules on large-scale AI development and deployment, the R&D challenges we list need significant progress.

Large language models demonstrate remarkable reasoning capabilities but often produce unreliable or incorrect responses. Existing verification methods are typically model-specific or domain-restricted, requiring significant computational resources and lacking scalability across diverse reasoning tasks. To address these limitations, we propose VerifiAgent, a unified verification agent that integrates two levels of verification: meta-verification, which assesses completeness and consistency in model responses, and tool-based adaptive verification, where VerifiAgent autonomously selects appropriate verification tools based on the reasoning type, including mathematical, logical, or commonsense reasoning. This adaptive approach ensures both efficiency and robustness across different verification scenarios. Experimental results show that VerifiAgent outperforms baseline verification methods (e.g., deductive verifier, backward verifier) among all reasoning tasks. Additionally, it can further enhance reasoning accuracy by leveraging feedback from verification results. VerifiAgent can also be effectively applied to inference scaling, achieving better results with fewer generated samples and costs compared to existing process reward models in the mathematical reasoning domain. Code is available at https://github.com/Jiuzhouh/VerifiAgent

AI agents that execute tasks via tool calls frequently hallucinate results - fabricating tool executions, misstating output counts, or presenting inferences as facts. Recent approaches to verifiable AI inference rely on zero-knowledge proofs, which provide cryptographic guarantees but impose minutes of proving time per query, making them impractical for interactive agents. We propose NabaOS, a lightweight verification framework inspired by Indian epistemology (Nyaya Shastra), which classifies every claim in an LLM response by its epistemic source (pramana): direct tool output (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), external testimony (shabda), absence (abhava), or ungrounded opinion. Our runtime generates HMAC-signed tool execution receipts that the LLM cannot forge, then cross-references claims against these receipts to detect hallucinations in real time. We evaluate on NyayaVerifyBench, a new benchmark of 1,800 agent response scenarios across four languages with injected hallucinations of six types. NabaOS detects 94.2% of fabricated tool references, 87.6% of count misstatements, and 91.3% of false absence claims, with <15ms verification overhead per response. For deep delegation (agents performing multi-step web tasks), our cross-checking protocol catches 78.4% of URL fabrications via independent re-fetching. We compare against five approaches: zkLLM (cryptographic proofs, 180s/query), TOPLOC (locality-sensitive hashing), SPEX (sampling-based proof of execution), tensor commitments, and self-consistency checking. NabaOS achieves the best cost-latency-coverage trade-off for interactive agents: 94.2% coverage at <15ms versus zkLLM's near-perfect coverage at 180,000ms. For interactive agents, practical receipt-based verification provides better cost-benefit than cryptographic proofs, and epistemic classification gives users actionable trust signals rather than binary judgments.

Reasoning protocols such as Chain of Thought (CoT) and Tree of Thought (ToT) organize internal deliberation but lack an explicit mechanism for external questioning that elicits self-revision. We present FOR-Prompting (From Objection to Revision Prompting), an asymmetric protocol where a Defender proposes an answer, an Objectioner raises question-style objections with no direct fixes, and a Host enforces consistency and closure. On GSM8K we observe about a 22% point gain over single-prompt and accuracy on par with CoT, with more than 10% higher ratings in reasoning and coherence from a uniform GPT 4.1 judge. FOR-Prompting also corrects mistakes without tools or human supervision on tricky queries, and improves performance for small-scale model (approx. 19% accuracy improved on Llama3.2:1b for GSM8K task), highlighting promise for small models and on personal device use. Beyond factual QA, qualitative analyses on open-ended tasks show enhanced exploration and refinement, with dialogue traces that make assumptions and trade-offs explicit. The protocol is model agnostic and operates purely at the prompt level through role-structured turns, so it works with hosted and local models of different sizes without retraining, and it supports large-scale study of objection-guided reasoning.

Modern generators render talking-head videos with impressive levels of photorealism, ushering in new user experiences such as videoconferencing under constrained bandwidth budgets. Their safe adoption, however, requires a mechanism to verify if the rendered video is trustworthy. For instance, for videoconferencing we must identify cases in which a synthetic video portrait uses the appearance of an individual without their consent. We term this task avatar fingerprinting. We propose to tackle it by leveraging facial motion signatures unique to each person. Specifically, we learn an embedding in which the motion signatures of one identity are grouped together, and pushed away from those of other identities, regardless of the appearance in the synthetic video. Avatar fingerprinting algorithms will be critical as talking head generators become more ubiquitous, and yet no large scale datasets exist for this new task. Therefore, we contribute a large dataset of people delivering scripted and improvised short monologues, accompanied by synthetic videos in which we render videos of one person using the facial appearance of another. Project page: https://research.nvidia.com/labs/nxp/avatar-fingerprinting/.

Self-driving laboratories increasingly rely on low-cost liquid handlers such as the Opentrons OT-2, which ship without the pressure-based aspiration monitoring of Hamilton or Tecan systems and are typically run open-loop. Two failure modes go undetected: protocols that are syntactically valid but violate assay-specific invariants (e.g., tip reuse between a PCR template and a no-template control), and physical execution failures (partial dispense, air bubbles, missing tips) at runtime. We present AEGIS, a two-layer guardian for both. Layer 1 pairs a curated machine-readable assay rule database with an LLM that reasons over OT-2 Python code, reaching an adjusted F1 of 0.97 on a 24-protocol benchmark across five assay families and beating rules-only and LLM-only ablations across five backends; a free open-weight model ties the best proprietary one, so no paid API is required. Layer 2 fits a PCA world model to YOLO-cropped four-frame pipette trajectories; under a leakage-free leave-one-plate-out evaluation it reaches average precision 0.89 and operating-point F1 0.71 (AUROC 0.80), a deployment-faithful number that matches the live demonstration, and we characterize the small-pipette (p20) resolution limit (F1 0.47). A live demonstration on a physical OT-2 (five replicates per condition) catches planted no-tip failures deterministically and partial dispense on coloured dyes, with an always-VLM self-vote gate lifting partial-dispense recall to 5/5; transparent water is a principled limit of any front-view-only monitor, which AEGIS surfaces as low-confidence VLM reasoning rather than a wrong verdict. Cascade triage holds VLM cost near 1.63 per plate versus 10.33 for an always-VLM baseline. AEGIS is open source and, to our knowledge, the first system to unify pre-flight assay-aware validation with runtime visual monitoring for an open-source liquid handler.